



EDGEWOOD ARSENAL CONTRACTOR REPORT

EM-CR-76097

ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDELINES, DRAWINGS AND SPÉCIFICATIONS FOR SUPPORT ENGINEERING OF SUPPRESSIVE SHIELDS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, Edgewood Arsenal
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010





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
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provided and properly configured to preclude fragment penetrations from inside the shield. Provisions must be made for all conceivable utilities and environmental conditioning which may be essential to the operations inside the shield.

These utility penetrations, ventilating and air conditioning ducts, and vacuum lines must not alter the basic mode of structural failure of the suppressive shield and should be small compared to the general size of the shield

Liners, both interior and exterior to the shield, may be required for certain operations, such as those wherein explosive dust is produced, to preclude contamination of the interior of the shield panels.

This report presents the formal documentation of all efforts and the results of a program to acquire and generate the information and data necessary to establish safety approved openings, penetrations, liners, finishes and foundations. Detail design drawings are included as well as substantiating calculations, welding procedures and maintenance procedures for the shields.



PREFACE

The work represented by this report was performed under task assignment No. 7 to Contract No. DAAA15-75-C-0120 for the Suppressive Shielding Branch, Manufacturing Technology Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal. This report presents the formal documentation of all efforts and results for the time period from November 1975 through December 1976.

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ENGINEERING DESIGN GUIDELINES, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR SUPPORT ENGINEERING

OF SUPPRESSIVE SHIELDS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objective

The objective of the task assignment was to acquire and/or generate information and data necessary to establish safety approved openings, penetrations, liners, and other items involved in applying the basic safety approved shield group structures to actual hazardous operations in Army ammunition plants.

B. Background.

The suppressive shielding program was initiated in 1969 to provide protective structures in the form of homogeneously vented enclosures as an alternative to the use of US Army TM 5-1300 walls. Edgewood Arsenal engineers have demonstrated the concept feasibility and have shown that blast overpressure, fireball, and fragmentation hazards from an accidental detonation can be significantly reduced or suppressed. Full scale prototype structures have been developed for applications for chemical agent munition demilitarization, white phosphorus munition processing, explosive ordnance disposal, and munitions production operations.

In 1973, the program was given increased impetus by US Army authorization to provide, within three years, a sound technological base for the concept. At the direction of the Project Manager for Munitions

Production Base Modernization and Expansion and with the cognizance of

the Suppressive Shielding Technical Steering Committee, a simultaneous program was initiated to provide proven prototype hardware applicable to hazardous munitions production operations. The Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board has approved five types of suppressive shields for use in US Army ammunition plants.

The five groups of suppressive shields approved cover the range of hazardous operations effects associated with explosive charge weights of up to 37 pounds of TNT equivalent. These are shield groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and the shield for the 81mm mortar round (referred to hereinafter as the "81mm shield"). The group 6 shield is not included in this study as it is not designed to house ammunition manufacturing equipment and does not have the same general operational requirements as the four other groups. Detailed characteristics and performance of these shield groups are shown in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Section III.

The application of suppressive shielding to ammunition manufacturing and other hazardous operations necessitates provision for access to the operation being protected. Personnel must be able to enter the shield to accomplish routine and emergency maintenance, clean-up, and other essential operations. A sufficient opening must also be provided to enable the equipment being protected to be installed or removed in realistically large subassemblies. Openings for conveyors, chutes, motor drives, shafts, etc., must also be provided and properly configured to preclude fragment penetrations from inside the shield. Provisions must be made for all conceivable utilities and environmental conditioning

which may be essential to the operations inside the shield.

These utility penetrations, ventilating and air conditioning ducts, and vacuum lines must not alter the basic mode of structural failure of the suppressive shield and should be small compared to the general size of the shield.

Liners, both interior and exterior to the shield, may be required for certain operations, such as those wherein explosive dust is produced, to preclude contamination of the interior of the shield panels. In the case of shields such as the group 5 shield, primarily designed for use with propellants or pyrotechnic materials, these liners must not inhibit the venting characteristics of the shield.

II. TECHNICAL APPROACH

The plan for reaching the objectives of this task consisted of five steps which include:

- An on-site survey of representative Army ammunition plants (AAP's)
 where suppressive shielding might be applied to hazardous operations.
- An evaluation of data gathered during the survey visits to determine requirements for each shield group.
- Development of designs, specifications, and guidelines based on these requirements.
- Preparation of outline test plans for items requiring testing.
- Preparation of a comprehensive final report which will include engineering guidelines to be used for preparing the design details for safety approved personnel openings, utility and product penetrations, and liners.

As the investigations progressed, discussions were held with other interested groups such as the Corps of Engineers, Huntsville, DARCOM safety personnel, and those attending the Suppressive Shielding Technical Steering Committee meeting at Southwest Research Institute in April 1976. As a result, it was determined that safety approval of design guidelines for openings, penetrations, liners, foundations, finishes, and other items necessary to make the shield groups fully operational might be possible without resorting to explosive testing. It was concluded that the results of testing already accomplished to qualify the basic shield group structures and certain openings and penetrations could be used with engineering analysis and rationale to present a sufficient case for

approved designs without having to perform individual tests on each type of opening, penetration, liner, and foundation provided the following criteria are applied:

- Doors for equipment, conveyors, personnel, and penetrations to accommodate utilities in suppressive shields must be designed to develop the full resistance to explosive blast forces of the structure without penetrations, so that the blast resistance of the structure is not impaired locally by any of the penetrations. It is sufficient to demonstrate this analytically by using established techniques for calculating structural response to dynamic loads, provided the penetration is a relatively minor structural feature. If the penetration is likely to change the mode of response of the structure appreciably, or if its dimensions are comparable to the overall shield dimensions, tests would be required to demonstrate the resistance of the modified structure to internal explosive blast.
- Protective covers for the utility penetrations must be designed to furnish the same fragment resistance as the structure. Generally, this will entail providing the same metal thickness in the region of the penetration as in the typical cross section of the shield.

III. FORMULATION OF REQUIREMENTS

A. Summary of Shield Group Characteristics.

The characteristics of each of the basic shield groups are presented in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The general constructional configuration of the shield groups 4, 5, and 81 mm are similar and consist of a frame structure which supports flat panels built up from varying arrangements of structural steel angles, Z-sections, and flat steel perforated plates. The basic overall configuration of these three shield group structures is that of a rectangular parallelepiped. The roof of each of these structures is of the same configuration as the particular side panels.


The shield group 3 configuration is different from the others. This structure is cylindrical with structural steel I-beams interlocked in a vertical orientation. The roof and supporting foundation are reinforced concrete bolted to the cylindrical section through cap plates supported by gussets. The space between the innermost flanges of the I-beams is bridged by an element of T-shaped cross section. This member is tack welded to the I-beams at each location. A liner of steel sheet is also provided as a part of the group 3 shield.

B. Summary of Ammunition Plant Surveys.

In order to accomplish the program objectives, it was first necessary to obtain information on the requirements for finishes and maintenance and for the various openings, penetrations, liners, and foundations.

A plan was formulated wherein selected Army ammunition plants would be visited by a survey team. The plants were

GROUP #3



INSIDE DIMENSIONS: 11.25 FT DIA, 10 FT HIGH

WEIGHT: 95,540 LBS (INCLUDING FOUNDATION)

TYPE CONSTRUCTION: BUILT-UP STRUCTURE USING I-BEAMS WITH STEEL LINER AND CONCRETE ROOF AND FOUNDATION

CHARGE WEIGHT (50-50 PENTOLITE):

a. DESIGN - 37 LBS

b. PROOF (25% OVERCHARGE) - 45.7 LBS

REFLECTED I MPULSE: (SIDEWALL)

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 414 PSI-MSEC

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 495 PSI-MSEC

REFLECTED PRESSURE: (SIDEWALL)

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 2728 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 3198 PSI

QUASI-STATIC PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 145 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 165 PSI


BLOWDOWN TIME (DESIGN): 2 SEC WITH $\alpha_e = 0.4\%$ (TOTAL)

NOMINAL STEEL THICKNESS (FRAGMENT PATH) : I IN

STATUS: SAFETY APPROVED

Figure 1 - Shield Group 3 Characteristics

GROUP #4



INSIDE DIMENSIONS:

9.2 FT WIDTH X 13.1 FT LENGTH X 9.3 FT HEIGHT

WEIGHT: 79,159 LBS

TYPE CONSTRUCTION:

I-BEAM FRAME, NESTED ANGLES AND PERFORATED PANELS

CHARGE WEIGHT (PENTOLITE):

a. DESIGN - 9 LBS

b. PROOF (25% OVERCHARGE) - 11.25 LBS

REFLECTED I MPULSE: (SIDEWALL)

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 162 PSI-MSEC

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 194 PSI-MSEC

REFLECTED PRESSURE: (SIDEWALL)

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 1387 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 1464 PSI

QUASI-STATIC PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 57 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 63 PSI

BLOWDOWN TIME (DESIGN): 88 MSEC WITH On = 3.09% (TOTAL)


NOMINAL STEEL THICKNESS (FRAGMENT PATH): 2.17 IN

MAXIMUM 2.17 IN.

MINIMUM 1.46 IN.

STATUS: SAFETY APPROVED

Figure 2 - Shield Group 4 Characteristics



INSIDE DIMENSIONS:

10.4 FT WIDTH X 10.4 FT LENGTH X 8.5 FT HEIGHT

WEIGHT: 16,772 LBS

TYPE CONSTRUCTION:

CHANNEL FRAME, ANGLES, PERFORATED PLATES AND SCREENS

CHARGE WEIGHT (C-4):

a. DESIGN - 1.84 LBS

b. PROOF (25% OVERCHARGE) - 2.44 LBS

REFLECTED I MPULSE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 44 PSI-MSEC

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 55 PSI-MSEC

REFLECTED PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 368 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 493 PSI

QUASI-STATIC PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 24 PSI


b. CALCULATED PROOF - 29 PSI

BLOWDOWN TIME (DESIGN): 44MSEC WITH $\alpha_{\rm e}$ =15.5% (PANELS) NOMINAL STEEL THICKNESS (FRAGMENT PATH): .427 in. IN.

STATUS: SAFETY APPROVED

Figure 3 - Shield Group 5 Characteristics

GROUP #81 MM



INSIDE DIMENSIONS:

14 FT WIDTH X 18.7 FT LENGTH X 12.4 FT HEIGHT

WEIGHT: 48,750 LBS

TYPE CONSTRUCTION:

BOX BEAM FRAME, Z BARS, PERFORATED PLATES AND LOUVERED PANELS

CHARGE WEIGHT (C-4):

a. DESIGN - 6.72 LBS

b. PROOF (25% OVERCHARGE) - 8.4 LBS

REFLECTED | MPULSE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 97 PSI-MSEC

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 115PSI-MSEC

REFLECTED PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 483 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 610 PSI

QUASI-STATIC PRESSURE:

a. CALCULATED DESIGN - 23 PSI

b. CALCULATED PROOF - 28 PSI

BLOWDOWN TIME (DESIGN): 82 MSEC WITH CE = 4.3% (TOTAL)

NOMINAL STEEL THICKNESS (FRAGMENT PATH): 1.23 IN.

STATUS: SAFETY APPROVED FOR TWO 81 MM ROUNDS.

SAFETY APPROVAL HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR
6.72 LB. OF C-4 OR EQUIVALENT.

Figure 4 - Shield Group 81MM Characteristics

selected to provide a cross section of hazardous operations to which suppressive structures could be applied. The plants selected for the survey were:

Lake City AAP, Independence, Missouri
Kansas AAP, Parsons, Kansas
Milan AAP, Milan, Tennessee
Iowa AAP, Burlington, Iowa
Indiana AAP, Charlestown, Indiana

Table 1 presents a summary of the potential applications for suppressive shielding at these AAP's and the corresponding shield groups to be considered.

In preparation for these on-site surveys, a letter was sent to the Commanding Officer of each of the AAP's requesting assistance in obtaining the required information and data. Also included was a questionnaire pertaining to the information desired. A copy of this letter and attendant list of questions is presented in Appendix A.

The survey of AAP's provided some of the data for establishing the criteria for finishes and maintenance, and for the various penetrations, openings, liners, and foundations necessary to enable the basic shield group structures to be made operational. Table 2 summarizes the information gathered through these survey visits as well as from other sources, such as the Corps of Engineers, Huntsville.

TABLE 1. Plant Survey Summary

AAP visited	PBM&E Projects surveyed	Application of safety approved S/S.	Other operations surveyed	Potential S/S applications
Lake City	o 3501 - 20/25/30 mm SCAMP production	o S/G 3 or 81 mm	o Tracer charging o 5.56/7.62 mm blank cartridge loading o Primer mfg. o Propellant storage	S/G 3 S/G 4 or 81 mm S/G 5 S/G 5
Iowa	o 2676 - Detonator facility front line o 2677 - 155 mm M549 M708 & 8" XM650 LAP	o S/G 6 o Quantities appear to be too large for currently safety approved shields	o XM718 LAP line (Shaped charge tank mine) o Melt-pour system o Automatic HE screening & weighing	o S/G 3 or 4 o S/G 1 o S/G 3
Indiana	o 2500 - 105 mm M67 propellant charge load & assembly o 2610 - 155 mm & 8" Propellant charge bag loading facility	o Quantities appear to be too large for currently safety approved shields o Same as Proj.#2500	c Black Powder plant -	o S/G 3 or 4 Around presses
Kansas	o 2702 - Detonator facility front line	9 5/S o	o 81 mm Ingersoll-Rand Automated LAP line o 105 mm (1000) line o CBU (1100) line	o 81 mm S/S around fuze cavity drilling & facing o S/G 3 or 4 o S/G 3 or 4
Milan	o 2709 - 60/81 mm MELT pour system	o 81 MM	o Minute-melter o 81 mm Ingersoll-Rand automated LAP line	o S/G 2 o 81 mm S/S around fuze cavity drilling and facing

TABLE 2 - REQUIREMENTS MATRIX

TYPE	SHELD	TYPICAL APPLICATION	REQUIREMENTS AND SIZING	REMARKS
A. Utilities				
Electricity	2	Minute Melter	Required, Sizing Undefined	
	8	Igniter Mix Press. Exp. Mat Screening	Required, Sizing Undefined	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Required, Sizing Undefined	
	2	20 mm HEI	125 KVA, 2" - 3" Line	LCAAP Application
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	440 - 480V 3 θ , or 2 inch dice 120 Volt, single $\theta \sim 1/2$ inch dia.	Dependent upon amperage
Water - General Use	2	Minute Melter	For Washdown, 1/2" diameter hose, 8GPM Nominal Flow	
	3	ignitermix Press, Exp. Mat Screening	For Washdown, 1/2" diameter hose, 8GPM Nominal Flow	
	4	105mm LAP Fuze	None Required	
	က	20 mm HEI	None Required	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	For Washdown, 1/2" diameter industrial hose, 8 GPM Nominal Flow	
Deluge	2	Minute Melter	450 - 500 GPM, 80 psig. 4 - 5 in. line	
	3	Igniter Mix Press, Exp. Mat Screening	2 - 2 1/2" lines (80-90 GPM) 80 psig	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	2 - 2 1/2" lines (80-90 GPM) 80 psig	
	2	20 num HEI	2 - 2 1/2" lines (80-90 GPM) 80 psig	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	2 - 2 1/2" lines (80-90 GMP) 80 psig	

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

TYPE	SHIELD TYPE	TYPICAL APPLICATION	REQUIREMENTS AND SIZING	REMARKS
Vacuum Systems	2	Minute Melter	None for Assembly, Cleanup Required	
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening Undefined	Undefined	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	None for Assembly, Cleanup Vacuum Required	
	5	20 mm HEI	Required, Requirements not Defined	
	81 mm	81 mm Cavity Facing Operation	300-400 CFM/Cubicle - 6" Hg Vacuum, System also required for 2" Diameter	System also required for cleaning can be vacuum cleane
Compressed Air	2	Minute Melter	100 psig dry supply, Flow undefined	style
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening Required, Sizing Undefined	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	100 psig dry supply, flow undefined	
	5	20 mm HEI	Undetermined	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	100 psig, 25 - 30 CFM, Dry	
B. Environmental Conditioning	nditioning			
Heating	2	Minute Melter	Required, Temp undefined	
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening Required, Temp ~70 - 75°F	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Undefined	
	2	20 mm HEI	System must maintain 70 - 75°F	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	None Required	à.

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

TYPE	TYPE	TYPICAL	REQUIREMENTS AND SIZING	. REMARKS
Air Conditioning	2	Minute Melter	Undefined, Probably Required	
	3	fgniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening Required, 65 + 5°F	Required, 65 ± 5°F	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Undefined	
	5	20 mm HEI	None Required	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	None Required	
Debumidification	2	Minute Melter	Undefined, Probably Required	
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Undefined	
	5	20 mm HEI	45 – 55 % RH	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	None Required	
Ventilation	2	Minute Melter	Undefined, Probably Required	
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Required, Undefined	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze Undefined	Undefined	
	9	20 mm HEI	Undetermined	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	None Required	

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

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TYPE	SHIELD TYPE	TYPICAL APPLICATION	REQUIREMENTS AND SIZING	REMARKS
C. Openings				
Personnel	2	Minute Melter	Maintenance Personnel	
	က	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening Maintenance Personnel	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Maintenance Personnel- Similar to 81 mm	
	2	20 mm HEI	Maintenance Personnel- Similar to 81 mm	
	81 mm	81 mm Cavity Facing	Sliding Door - 11 x 4 feet suspended by Monorail	Ref EM-CR-76018
Handling Equipment Installation and	2	Minute Melter	Undefined	
Removal Oriented	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Undefined, ~2.5 x 5 (From Drawing)	•
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Undefined	
	2	20 mm HEI	None Required	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	Required, ~4' x 6'	
Handling Equipment Munitions Movement	2	Minute Melter	Product Door, Component Transfer System	Dependent Upon Design
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Product Door	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Product Door	
	5	20 mm HEI	Yes, Powder Input and Component Transfer System	Dependent Upon Design
	81 mm	81 mm Cavity Facing Operation	Rotating Product Door - 11" High by 14" in Diameter	Ref EM-CR-76018

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

TYPE	SHIELD TYPE	TYPICAL APPLICATION	REQUIREMENTS AND SIZING	REMARKS
D. Protective Liners				
Internal	2	Minute Melter	Liner Required	
	3	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Two Liners 12 gauge (.081 " each)	,
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	Liner Required	
	c	20 mm HEI	Liner Required	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	Liner Required to prevent dust from entering shield configuration	ě.
External	64	Minute Melter	Liner Required	
	8	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening None Required	None Required	
	4	105 mr LAP Fuze	None Required	
	2	20 n . HEI	None Required	
	81 mm	Cavt , Facing Operation	Liner Required	
E. Other				
Lighting	23	Minute Melter	Fluorescent Type Fixtures, Explosive Proof	
	8	Igniter Mix Press Exp. Mat Screening	Fluorescent Type Fixtures, Explosive Proof	
	4	105 mm LAP Fuze	9	
	2	20 mm HEI	Fluorescent Type Fixtures, Explosive Proof	
	81 mm	Cavity Facing Operation	Fluorescent Type Fixtures, Explosive Proof, 277 Volt	
	-			

IV. DISCUSSION OF UTILITY PENETRATIONS.

The utility services which must be provided to the operations inside the suppressive shields considered in this investigation consisted of electricity, water both for general use and deluge systems, and compressed air. For ease of installation, the utility penetrations in the groups 4, 5, and 81mm shields are located directly adjacent to a column or beam member at the floor or ceiling of the structure. For the group 3 shield, which does not have beam or column members like the others, the penetration is located above the floor gussets and is supported by them.

The individual utility lines should be arranged with the lowest being deluge water, next highest the general water service, then compressed air and finally the electrical line in the topmost position. This is recommended to preclude water, leaking from loose or improperly installed connections, from contacting the electrical line and causing a short circuit. An artist's concept of a typical utility penetration is shown in Figure 5 and locations of typical penetrations are shown in Figures 6 and 7.

Utility lines passing through suppressive shield walls are vulnerable to both blast and fragment hazards. The blast could push unprotected utility penetrations through the walls of the shield and create secondary fragments, or fragments from the exploding operation could penetrate the thin walls of an unprotected utility pipe.

A protective box was designed to eliminate the challenge of blast and fragments to the utility penetrations. This protective box surrounds the right angle bend of the utilities as they pass through the shield wall.

The box rests on the inside of the shield wall and is tack welded in place.

In the recommended design, the actual penetrations through the shield wall are limited to those required for the utilities, i.e., pipes of 1/2 inch to

Figure 5 - Typical Utility Penetration




Figure 6 - Typical Location of Utility Penetration in Shield Groups 4, 5 and $81\,\mathrm{mm}$




Figure 7 - Typical Location of Utility Penetrations in Shield Group 3

3 inches in diameter. The penetration is a sleeve or box section welded to the shield panel through which the utility line passes. This insures that the structural members of the shield wall are not weakened by the penetration because (1) the utility penetration is welded in place, and (2) the penetration hole is small compared to the total shield wall area.

The mode of failure of the suppressive shield will not be changed due to the utility penetrations. A similar penetration system was tested on all shield groups. Reflected pressure and quasi-static pressure gages were mounted in shield walls using a pipe penetration which was welded to the panel. The inner diameter of the pipe was threaded to accommodate the pressure gages. No problems were encountered for these 1-3/4 inch diameter penetrations during tests conducted in the 1/4 and 1/16 scale group 1 test fixtures and the group 3, 4, and 5 shields.

The utility box cover plate was designed to stop fragments from penetrating the box. The nominal steel thickness shown in figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the safety approved shields was selected as the cover plate thickness. Analysis indicated that the material thickness required to stop the fragments is greater than the thickness required to withstand the blast pressure loading; however, calculations were performed to assure that the utility box side plates would not shear through the panel wall or that the added mass would not adversely affect the structural response. These calculations are summarized in Table 3 for each safety approved shield and a sample calculation is shown in Appendix B. Table 3 indicates that the addition of the utility box reduces the ductility ratio, u. This is caused by the added mass increasing the natural period which reduces the structural deflection and the ductility ratio.

It is concluded that the addition of the utility box to the interior of the shield wall will not adversely affect the basic response of the structural elements.

TABLE 3 SHEAR AND STRUCTURAL RESPONSE DATA

		STRUCTURAL D	UCTILITY RATIO
SHIELD GROUPS	SHEAR SAFETY MARGIN, M	ORIGINAL µ	μ WITH PROTECTIVE BOX
3	9.1	24.2	8.8
4	6.6	3.4	3.1
5	31.3	6.0	4.0
81MM	12.6	40*	35*

*Based upon 5.25 lbs. of pentolite

** $M_S = \frac{Shear\ Strength\ of\ Material}{Dynamic\ Shear\ Stress\ (S_W)} - 1$ based on S_W which is the shear stress of the protective box through the shield wall

V. DISCUSSION OF VACUUM LINE PENETRATIONS

Vacuum line penetrations are required for those operations where explosive chips and dust are generated, for example, the fuze cavity drill and facing operation for the 81mm mortar projectile.

Depending upon the details of the operation requiring a vacuum line, the location of the penetration could be either in the side walls or the ceiling of the shield. The vacuum line penetration is designed to be located in the corner of the shield groups 4, 5, and 81mm adjacent to a beam and column, two beams, or a column and the base of the shield. For the group 3 shield, the vacuum line penetration is designed to pass through the wall at any location on the centerline of an inner vertical I-beam. The roof on the group 3 shield is reinforced concrete and no penetrations have been designed to pass through this structural element.

A design study was conducted (Reference 1) to determine the most desirable system for removal of explosive chips and dust. The vacuum system was selected. Details of the penetration of the vacuum line are illustrated in Figure 8 and typical vacuum line penetrations are shown in Figures 9 and 10. The external cylinder which houses the vacuum line is designed to prevent hazardous fragments from penetrating the cylinder wall. The cylinder is flanged on both sides of the shield panel to allow attachment of elbows as shown. This further prevents any fragments from penetrating the vacuum line and possibly exiting the shield.

Design analysis of the vacuum line for an accidental detonation inside the vacuum line is presented in Reference 1 and is not included herein.

The reader should refer to that report for detailed discussion and analysis




Figure 8 - Vacuum Line Penetration




Figure 9 - Typical Location of Vacuum Line Penetration in Shield Group 3




Figure 10 - Typical Location of Vacuum Line Penetration in Shield Groups 4, 5 and 81mm

of the blast loading and response.

To assure that the vacuum line penetration through the shield panel will not fail due to the internal blast loading resulting from the detonation of the explosive munition, an analysis was performed and is presented in Appendix C.

VI. LINERS.

A. Introduction. The vented or porous nature of the suppressive shield walls creates a potential for explosive and/or flammable dust to filter into and subsequently accumulate within the wall interior. The dust could come from an operation being performed inside the shield or from an exterior source. A means for attaching and sealing both the interior and exterior of the vented panels must be provided. The concept selected to prevent the accumulation of dust in the shield wall is a liner which covers the inner and outer surfaces of the vented panels. Special attention should be given to the joints of the inner and outer liners to assure that the joints will not provide a route for explosive dust entry into the shield wall structure and that the joints themselves will not create an additional location for the accumulation of explosive dusts.

The addition of liners to a suppressive shield could have an adverse effect on the performance of shields of certain groups if the nature of the hazardous material being shielded is not considered. When shielding hazardous operations which involve pyrotechnic materials or propellants, the ventilating properties of the shield must be designed to minimize the long duration pressure load on the structure. The liner for such applications must break or burn away so that ventilating properties are retained. For explosive materials the ventilation requirements are different. If the structure is designed to withstand the combined impulsive and quasi-static pressure loads, fragment impact, and thermal effects, a continuous metal liner which remains in place during the incident (e.g.,

the metal liner for the group 3 shield) is acceptable. Such continuous metal liners must not seal the shield sufficiently to prevent the products of combustion from venting such that the shield becomes in effect a pressure vessel. Some shields for use with explosives, such as the 81mm shield, are not designed to withstand the loads they would experience with a continuous metal liner. Liners for these shields must be designed so that the initial blast overpressure blows out the liner to provide the venting properties designed into the shield. In all designs with liners which break away, care must be taken that hazardous secondary fragments are not produced outside the shield by pieces of the liner.

Some preliminary tests (Ref. 2) with plastic sheet liners, i.e., polyethylene and mylar sheeting, were conducted in the 81mm suppressive shield at NASA National Space Technology Laboratories (NASA NSTL) by the Edgewood Arsenal Resident Laboratory to determine the effect of liners on structural loading and blast attenuation. Blast pressure measurements outside the vented walls compared to those outside the lined walls showed no measurable difference. This indicated that the thin (4-6 mil) plastic liner did not attenuate the explosive blast effects to any measurable degree. Internal pressures and hence, loading of the frame and panel structure, were also not significantly affected by the use of the liners.

Tests have also been conducted in the group 3 and 5 shields using metal liners covering the interior surfaces of these shields. Strain gauge data from high explosive tests in the group 3 shield indicated no significant increase in the loads imposed on the structural members due to the blast containment by the metal liners (Reference 3). Similar tests in a group 5

shield with metal liners indicated no apparent visual degradation of the structure when compared to tests with identical charge weights in the group 5 shield without metal liners.

These tests with the thin metal and plastic interior liners have thus demonstrated that:

- (1) Explosive materials can be confined in a suppressive shield with a rigid liner that does not allow venting of the blast pressure if the structure is designed to take the loads.
- (2) A frangible plastic liner can be used on a shield containing explosive materials without affecting the venting characteristics.
- (3) For deflagrating materials (pyrotechnics and propellants), the venting is essential to prevent shield damage.
 - B. Liners for Explosive Materials.

Thin steel sheet internal liners have been tested in the group 3 and 5 shields. The group 3 shield liners investigated were:

- (1) 24-gage (.024inch) corrugated galvanized steel.
- (2) Two 22-gage (.060 inch) corrugated galvanized steel.

The 24-gage liner sustained considerable failure in the 45.7-pound explosive proof tests. The liner sheared along the edges of the blocking strips (where the liner was unsupported) indicating insufficient strength. In the subsequent proof tests in the group 3 shield using the two 22-gage liners, the shearing did not occur though the liner was flattened and some bulging resulted. The two layers of material had their lap joints staggered so

that they were 13 inches apart and were attached by pop rivets and 10 penny nails at the top and bottom edges of the liners.

The group 5 shield liner was flat galvanized steel sheet, 24-gage. A single sheet was used to cover each panel and was attached using sheet metal screws. This liner was successfully proof tested with 2.44 pounds of C-4 explosive. Pressure measurements indicated no difference between the group 5 shield proof tests with or without liners. Therefore, steel liners can be used on the group 5 shield when this shield is applied to explosive operations.

Steel liners have not been tested in the 81mm shield or the group 4 shield and are not proposed for use on these shields. Insufficient data is available to allow application of the liners used in the group 3 and 5 shields to the explosive operations of group 4 and the 81mm shield.

For final application of liners to the group 3 and 5 shields, a soft gasket material or caulking compound is recommended to seal the liner-panel interface and to prevent accumulations of explosive dust at inaccessible locations. Typical installation details are shown in Figure 11.

c. Liners for Deflagrating Materials. Tests conducted in the group 5 shield with internally installed thin metal liners and 50-pound charge of deflagrating illuminant composition (55% NaNO₃-45% Mg granulated) resulted in significant permanent deformation of the structural members. Roof members were bent approximately 2 inches from normal and the wall columns approximately 1 inch. Previous tests in this shield without liners and illuminant composition charges of from 10-50 pounds caused no measurable




Figure 11 - Typical Installation of Thin Metal Liners

distortion of the structural members (Reference 4). These results indicate that the group 5 shield will require internal and external liners fabricated from lightweight material which will disintegrate, decompose, or fracture when a deflagrating material reacts in the shield. This will allow the rapidly expanding gases to bleed off as they are produced by the reaction, thus preventing an excessive pressure buildup in the structure.

A number of plastic film materials were investigated as possible candidates for suppressive shields requiring frangible internal liners. The material tentatively selected was the 3-M Company's Velostat plastic film. This material exhibits the following properties:

- conductive
- abrasive/tear resistant
- disintegrates rapidly under flame
- workable

It can be purchased with an adhesive applied to one side to allow easy attachment to the panel surface. Attachment would be accomplished as shown on Figure 12.

The liner material for external application requires the same characteristics as the internal liner material plus the additional requirements of being incapable of producing lethal or damaging fragments. The Velostat material meets all these requirements.

Care must be taken with the installation of adhesive-backed plastic liners to prepare the shield surface so a good bond is achieved and to




Figure 12 - Typical Installation of Thin Plastic Liners

attach the material with no wrinkles or gaps through which hazardous material can enter inaccessible regions of the panels.

D. Recommendations

Table 4 shows for each of the safety approved shields the recommended internal and external liner systems. In all cases, a sealing system has been proposed which will preclude dust accumulation or leakage around the liner. This will also keep the extreme edges of the Velostat material from pulling loose and curling.

Based on previously cited tests with sheet metal and plastic liners, and the properties of the Velostat material, it is recommended that a test series be conducted in the group 5 shield with both internal and external liners installed. The test objectives are (1) to determine the effects of internal and external liners on the structural loading and response for deflagrating materials, and (2) to determine the practicability, feasibility, and possible problems associated with attachment of thin film liners to suppressive shields.

The results and findings of this test series will be detailed in a subsequent report and included in the suppressive-shielding engineering-design handbook.

TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED LINERS FOR SUPPRESSIVE SHIELDS

Shield Group	Interior Liner	Exterior Liner	Attachment Method	
			Internal	External
3	Sheet Metal	Velostat	Screws & Caulk	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips
4	Velostat	Velostat	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips
5	Velostat	Velostat	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips
81mm	Velostat	Velostat	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips	Adhesive & Cemented Plastic Strips

VII. PERSONNEL DOOR.

Suppressive shields are designed to protect hazardous operations involved in the munition plant environment. These operations are hazard category III and require remote operation. Personnel will not be inside the shield during operation. However, access to the equipment involved in the hazardous operation must be provided to allow for maintenance, repair, and inspection as required. Personnel doors have been designed for each of the safety approved shields. Exits from these shields have not been designed in accordance with AMCR 385-100, Section 5-7, since no personnel will be in the shield during the operation. The door will remain open for conditions requiring personnel access.

Early shield designs contained a hinged door which swung inward. Application of suppressive shields to munition operations indicated that this inward swinging door reduced the operating space inside the shield. As a result, a sliding door was included in the group 4 shield design to eliminate interference with equipment inside the shield. This door concept was successfully proof tested in the group 4 shield. Based on these test results, the group 4 sliding door design was modified for use with the 81mm shield. Reference 5 describes in detail the sliding door design and provides engineering drawings of the 81mm shield sliding door. Safety approval has been obtained for the 81mm and group 4 shields sliding doors.

Using the same design principles, a sliding door was designed for the group 5 shield. (This shield was proof tested with a hinged door.) The sliding door design is shown in Figures 13 and 14, and calculations are provided




Figure 13 - Sliding Personnel Door

in Appendix D. For all the sliding door designs, the door consists of an entire shield panel suspended from a beam above the panel by means of a monorail. Since the panel is inside the shield and is not rigidly attached to the shield column members, a gap between the panel and column exists. External blast pressure measurements in the group 4 shield tests indicated that increased venting did not occur in this area, apparently due to sealing of the panel/column gap by the blast pressure prior to leakage of the pressure.

The group 3 shield is cylindrical in shape and contains a double-hinged door with a total opening 4.5 feet high by 3 feet wide. The door consists of two leaves curved to match the shield contour and fabricated from S5 x 10 interlocked I-beams. Pressure loading restraint is provided by the door bearing on the external support rings at the top and bottom of the door. A latch is provided on the exterior of the door to provide restraint during rebound of the door inward. Figure 15 illustrates the group 3 shield door configuration and the Design Analysis is provided in Appendix D. A sliding door was not designed for this shield since the two-leaf configuration minimizes the clearance required inside the shield for opening this door. For special applications that require a sliding door, the design analysis procedures provided in Appendix D for the group 5 shield door can be used.




Figure 14 - Location of Personnel Door in Shield Groups 4, 5 and 81mm




Figure 15. Hinged Door in Group 3 Shield

VIII. PRODUCT DOOR

Application of suppressive shields to munition operations requires penetrations of the shield wall for pass-through of the munition and the conveyor transporting the munition and/or munition components. A rotating product door has been designed, fabricated, proof tested, and safety approved for use in the group 4 shield and the 81mm shield. The detailed design analysis for this door is provided in Reference 5. An artist's concept is shown in Figure 16 and a typical location is shown in Figure 17.

Requirements for product doors are specialized depending on configuration of the product, pallets, and conveyors, as well as production rates and other factors unique to each operation. For these reasons, individual product doors must be designed separately for each application using the principles provided in Reference 5.

To allow use of new door designs, engineering analysis must show that the designs do not adversely affect strength or mode of response of the shield panels or wall components under the dynamic loads anticipated.




Figure 16- 81MM Product Door




Figure 17 - Typical Location of Product Door




Figure 17 - Typical Location of Product Door

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING PENETRATIONS

Information obtained during the AAP survey visits indicated that certain hazardous operations required special environmental control, air temperature, and humidity. To provide the necessary environmental conditioning, the air inside a suppressive shield must be changed. Since operating personnel are not present inside a shield during an explosive operation, it is not necessary to change the air to meet such requirements as provided by OSHA.

Depending upon the air conditioning requirements for a particular operation, the air can be introduced inside the suppressive shield in a number of ways. For example, it may be sufficient to use conditioned air around the outside of the shield and have it "leak" through to the inside via the spaces around the shield penetrations such as personnel and product doors. Where the air flow requirements cannot be satisfied in this manner, an inlet duct of sufficient thickness to withstand the blast loading and of such configuration to preclude fragment passage can be provided through the panels. The equipment which provides the air into the shield must be located such that the effects of blast will not endanger personnel who might normally be in the area. It is recommended that each shield have its own environmental conditioning equipment since it would probably be sacrificed or at least severely damaged in the event of an accident.

For the removal of air from inside the suppressive shield, a similar duct with the proper employment of filters (as required) to keep explosive dust from exiting the shield can be used. In operations where a waste disposal (vacuum line) system is used, this may prove to be a feasible method for exhausting air to the exterior of the shield with a duct extending as a stack through the roof. This is illustrated in Figure 18.

Sample calculations for the environmental conditioning penetration are presented in Appendix ${\tt E.}$




Figure 18 - Typical Environmental Conditioning Penetration

X. FINISHES

Suppressive shields will be installed in a wide variety of operating environments. These environments may include extremely corrosive acids, caustics, electrochemical reactions, gases and vapors, dusts, or other compositions which may react adversely with steel. It is virtually impossible to anticipate these environments and call out the proper specifications and procedures for surface preparation, priming, and painting of the various structural materials. Existing military and Federal specifications for finishes which are normally used in US Army ammunition plants shall be used for the suppressive shields as applicable. Applicable specifications and procedures must be a part of the technical data package prepared by the architect-engineer for a specific application and environment.

XI. DISCUSSION OF SHIELD MAINTENANCE

- A. Preventive Maintenance. A typical standing operating procedure (SOP) which addresses normal periodic preventive maintenance has been prepared and is presented in Appendix F. This SOP is written without any particular Army ammunition plant (AAP) or operating environment in mind. Therefore, it must be used only as a general guide for a specific SOP requirement in a specific location and operation. Local safety, maintenance, operations, quality control policies, and procedures would necessarily dictate much of the form, format, and content of the actual SOP. In addition, the type of hazard, the environment, and other specific local conditions would also dictate the SOP content.
- B. Corrective Maintenance. No specific corrective maintenance procedures have been outlined in this report since the number of possible corrections, repairs, and the like will vary with each situation. In the event that corrective maintenance is required due to damage to shield, care should be taken to consult the technical data package drawings and specifications prior to performing the maintenance. This will insure that the proper structural members, welding specifications, other material specifications, and quality control procedures are followed and that the shield will have been restored to its original structural integrity.
- C. Rehabilitation and Repair. To obtain the most efficient and cost effective design, suppressive structures were developed to deform plastically when exposed to explosive blast loading. This principle is termed "limit" design." By allowing structures to plastically deform, a larger

portion of the energy from an explosive detonation can be converted into plastic work by permitting permanent deformation of the suppressive structure. This structural deformation is described by the "ductility ratio", which is the ratio of maximum deflection to maximum elastic deflection. Allowable ductility ratios are defined in terms of structural reusability. Structures with a µ less than 6 are considered reusable. This does not infer that a suppressive structure with a µ less than 6 will not require some rebabilitation and repair work after an accidental detonation within the confines of the structure. Nowever, it does indicate that the structural members are sound and the suppressive shield will withstand another detonation.

Ductility ratios were computed for all the safety approved shields, i.e., shield groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and the 81mm, and the reusable explosive charge weight determined. Table 5, below, lists the reusable charge weights for ductility ratios less than 6.

TABLE __5
SAFETY APPROVED SHIELDS REUSABLE CHARGE WEIGHTS

Shield	Charge Weight	TNT Equivalent
Group 3	37 lbs 50/50 pentolite	41.77 lbs.
Group 4	9 lbs 50/50 pentolite	10.16 lbs.
Group 5	1.84 lbs 50/50 pentolite	2.08 lbs.
Group 6	0.75 1b 50/50 pentolite	.85 1bs.
81mm	Two 81mm M374 mortar rounds	3.02 lbs.

All of the above listed charge weights are equal to the design charge weight for which safety approval was obtained. Therefore, all the safety approved shields are reusable for the maximum approved charge weight.

The previous discussion addressed the reuse of suppressive shields exposed to explosive blast loads. In many instances, an explosive detonation involves the generation of fragments which impact the shield surfaces and cause partial penetrations of the structural members. These penetrations can vary in size from small, superficial holes which do not affect the structure in terms of reuse or venting characteristics to large fragments that could penetrate or damage a column member and significantly affect the strength of that member. For explosive detonations involving the generation of fragments, it will be necessary to perform an engineering analysis to determine the need to replace the components of the structure. Since each shield is of unique design, the rehabilitation and repair required for each is different. For example, it would be easier and less expensive to replace a group 6 shield, whereas damage to a panel in the 81mm shield would be cost effectively repaired by replacing the panel, not the complete shield.

Procedures designed for decontamination should be performed prior to any rehabilitation and repair. All specifications defined for each shield should be followed during these operations.

The panel/frame type shields, i.e., groups 4 and 5 and the 31mm, are designed for easy replacement of entire panels or individual column members. The group 3 shield is more complex since the I-beams used to make up the cylindrical side walls are interlocked. Replacing these I-beams will require removal of the concrete roof and detachment of the I-beams from the foundation. Rehabilitation and repair of damaged shields will require this type of individual treatment.

D. <u>Decontamination</u>. Decontamination of the shields shall be in accordance with the local Army Ammunition Plant's SOP's, AMCR 385-100 (Safety Manual) and ARMCOM Regulation 385-5 (Contamination, Decontamination and Disposal).

Also local regulations and SOP's regarding flame permits prior to welding shall be followed. An example of a welding procedure and qualification is presented in Appendix G. This procedure is applicable to rehabilitation and repair of the shields as well as to their construction.

XII. FOUNDATIONS

A. Introduction.

Each safety approved suppressive shield has a foundation design for anchoring the structure securely in place. Shields should be prevented from excessive motion in the event of an accidental detonation to minimize damage to conveyors, utilities, and the like, that pass through the shield or to overhead structures. Shield groups 3 and 5 have been tested with concrete foundations used to anchor the shield. No motion was observed during the conduct of the proof tests of these structures after review of high speed films taken to document the tests.

B. Group 3 Shield Foundation.

The foundation used in the group 3 shield is shown in Figure 19, and is 13 feet, 4 inches in diameter, 18 inches thick, and constructed based on TM 5-1300 design procedures. The detailed design analysis is provided in Appendix H. The foundation was proof tested with 45.7 pounds of 50/50 pentolite at Aberdeen Proving Ground and only superficial cracking at the concrete surface was observed.

C. Group 4 Shield Foundation.

The group 4 shield foundation is illustrated in Figure 20. This foundation was designed to conform with a standard concrete floor existing at Lone Star AAP. Actual drawings were obtained from Lone Star AAP to determine the concrete thicknesses, rebar requirements, and concrete specifications necessary to fabricate the foundation. Due to material availability at Dugway Proving Ground (the fabrication/erection site),

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


Figure 19 - Shield Group 3 Foundation Details




Figure 20 - Shield Group 4 Foundation Details

the actual foundation varied from the Lone Star AAP drawings as follows:

(1) Number 10 wire mesh was used instead of Number 6, and (2) the concrete skirt around the periphery was not installed. Additionally, a 3/4-inch thick steel plate was placed on the top of the concrete foundation over a wet cement grout. This installation was performed to minimize plate deflection and fragment damage to the concrete slab during repeated testing.

Tests with bare high explosive charges up to 11 pounds and two 105mm rounds were fired in the group 4 shield. Fragmentation from the two 105mm rounds was severe. Examination of the foundation after the fragment and proof test revealed some hairline cracks at the foundation periphery. The steel plate buckled in several places and was gouged from the many fragment hits. High speed motion pictures of the tests indicated a slight upward movement of the structure of from 1-2 inches. This movement could cause some problems in the operating environment and care should be taken in using this structure where shield penetrations are required. If rigid penetrations are required and if it is important that they not be damaged in an accident, then this shield should be anchored to the concrete foundation in a more rigid manner.

D. Group 5 Shield Foundation.

The foundation for the group 5 shield is a 15 feet by 15 feet and 18 inches thick monolithic reinforced concrete slab (see Figure 21).

A series of high explosive and derlagrating materials tests were conducted in the shield. The proof pressure test was conducted using 2.44 pounds of explosive. Illuminant composition charges consisting of 55 percent Sodium Nitrate and 45 percent granulated magnesium were also fired inside the shield group 5 structure. Temperatures in the range of 4000-5000°F were generated by illuminant charges of 10-50 pounds.




Figure 21 - Shield Group 5 Foundation Details


Visual examination of the concrete pad after the explosive and illuminant composition tests showed no significant cracking or deterioration of the slab.

E. 81 mm Shield Foundation

The foundation for the 81 mm shield consisted of a 1/4-inch thick steel plate welded to the bottom of the panel members which rested on a packed clay gravel base. This system was for test purposes only and was not intended as a tiedown device. This structure lifted vertically 5 inches above the ground during testing with two 81 mm mortar projectiles. To prevent this movement in an operating plant environment, the Corps of Engineers, Huntsville designed a system to anchor the shield to the concrete floor in the plant. The tiedown procedure is illustrated in Figure 22. The design analysis investigated the effect of rigidly attaching the shield to a concrete foundation and no adverse effects were indicated. The tiedown method will allow incorporation in an existing facility by removing the concrete in the tiedown locations and then replacing as required.

F. Floor Drains.

Floor drains are an integral part of the concrete foundation design. Suitable floor drains are to be designed by the Corps of Engineers, Huntsville in accordance with existing design criteria for Army ammunition plants and effluent requirements for the particular operation(s) inclosed by the shield.



FOUNDATION FOR 81 MM SUPPRESSIVE SHIELD scale 3/8 IN. = 1 FT 0 IN.

Figure 22 -Shield Group 81MM Foundation Details

APPENDIX A - SAMPLE LETTER SENT TO AAP'S PRIOR TO SITE SURVEY



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS. EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND. MARYLAND 21010

SAREA-MT-TS

SUBJECT: Suppressive Shielding Requirements Survey

Commander, Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Milan, TN 38358 Commander, Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, KS 67357

Commander, Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Charlestown, IN 47111 Commander, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Independence, MO 64056

Commander, Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, Burlington, IA 52502

- 1. Suppressive shields for a wide variety of hazardous munitions plant operations have been developed by our Suppressive Shielding Branch, Mechanical Process Technology Division, Manufacturing Technology Directorate, under Manufacturing Methods and Technology Project 1264. As a part of this program, which supports the US Army Munitions Production Base Modernization and Expansion Program, we have initiated an effort to obtain safety approval for interior and exterior shield liners, and for various openings and penetrations required in suppressive shields for personnel, equipment, utilities, and environmental conditioning. Inclosure 1 depicts a suppressive shield surrounding a typical munitions plant operation with the various ancillary utilities and services required for the operation.
- 2. The initial phase of this effort is to conduct a survey of AAP expansion and modernization projects in which suppressive shields could be effectively utilized. Based on a review of Munitions Production Base Modernization and Expansion projects scheduled for completion during the FY 78 FY 80 time frame the following projects have been selected:
- a. Lake City Army Ammunition Plant: Project 3501, 30mm GAU-8 Production Equipment (SCAMP).
- b. Kansas Army Ammunition Plant: Project 2702, Detonator Facility Front Line.
 - c. Milan Army Ammunition Plant: Project 2709, 60/81 mm Melt System
- d. Iowa Army Ammunition Plant: Project 2677, 155 mm M549, M708 and 8" \times M650 LAP.
 - e. Indiana Army Ammunition Plant:
 - (1) Project 2500, 105 mm M67 Propellant Charge Load and Assembly.





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS. EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND. MARYLAND 21010

SAREA-MT-TS SUBJECT:


Suppressive Shielding Requirements Survey

- (2) Project 2610, 155 mm and 8-Inch Propellant Charge Bag Loading Facility.
- 3. The objective of these plant surveys is to determine the requirements for specific suppressive shield applications for the projects listed above. These should be based upon hazard level of the operation as well as your needs for the equipment and process insofar as it is possible for them to be defined at this time. Inclosure 2 contains questions which are considered to be pertinent to the determination of these requirements. It is requested that they be answered, as applicable, and presented for discussion during the visit of the survey team to your plant. It is requested that drawings, specifications, sketches, and other data pertinent to your particular needs be provided to the survey team during this visit. It is also requested that Government and contractor representatives from engineering, safety, and production groups be available for discussion with the survey team, if possible.
- 4. The team, comprised of Mr. Douglas M. Koger and Mr. Joseph F. Voeglein from Edgewood Arsenal, and Mr. F. James Schroeder from AAI Corporation, is scheduled to conduct the survey as follows:
 - a. Lake City Army Ammunition Plant 5 November 1975.
 - b. Kansas Army Ammunition Plant 6-7 November 1975.
 - c. Milan Army Ammunition Plant 10 November 1975.
 - d. Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 17 November 1975.
 - e. Indiana Army Ammunition Plant 19 November 1975.
- 5. Should you have any questions or desire any additional information relative to this survey or any other aspects of the project, please contact Dr. David J. Katsanis, Chief, Suppressive Shielding Branch, AUTOVON 584-2302/2661.
- 6. ARMCOM control number for this visit is OP-75-1015-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD G. THRESHER
Chief, Mechanical Process
Technology Division
Manufacturing Technology Directorate

2 Incl 1h



REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST

	Project	No. Title	
	Station		Operation
	Hazard L	evelSuppressive Sh	ield Requirement
	Describe	the hazardous operation in	terms of the following:
	1. What operatio		e will have to be supplied to the hazardous
	Utility		Requirements
Isa	Electric blelda Compress		
	Vacuum		
	Water		
	for	general use	
	for	deluge system	
oeration?	Other To alse r	quired fo	
	2. What	openings for entry into an	d exit from the shield are anticipated?
	Openings	1	Requirements
	Personne	1	
		Equipment for Installation e., forklift trucks)	•
		g Equipment for Munitions (i.e., conveyors)	
	Other		
		environmental conditioning	is required in the area of the operation?
	Item		Requirement
	17		

3. (Continued)

Item

Requirement

Ventilating

Air Conditioning

Dehumidifying

Other

4. Do you anticipate the need for protective liners? Does the operation produce explosive dust? Could operations external to the shield, in the general area of the shield, produce dust or other contaminants from which the shield should be protected?

Item

Requirements

Internal Liner

External Liner

5. What specific interlocks would you anticipate being required for safe operation?

Interlock

Requirements

Personnel Openings

Handling Equipment Openings

Conveyor Openings

Utility Penetrations

Other

APPENDIX B - CALCULATIONS FOR UTILITIES PENETRATIONS

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Calculations for Utility Penetrations

Structural analysis of the protective box for suppressive, shield utilities is based upon the conservation of energy method where the structure responds dynamically to both reflected and quasi-static pressures. (Ref. 6) Both short and long duration pressures are considered.

The following conditions are assumed to be achieved:

- 1) Elements do not buckle before they reach their maximum deflection
- 2) A bilinear resistive function.
- 3) The law of conservation of energy applies.

The law of conservation of energy for a multiple pulse (short and long duration) input shows that:

External Work - Internal Work = Δ Kinetic Energy

The basic structural equation is given below and relates the maximum deflection to pressure loads, structural resistance and the natural period of the structural member.

$$\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{C_1 P_m}{r_y} \\
\frac{T_n \sqrt{2\mu-1}}{\sigma t_d}
\end{pmatrix} + \frac{C_2 P_m}{r_y} = 1$$
(1)

Where C1 Pm = Pr - Pqs

C2 Pm = Pqs

Pr = reflected pressure - psi

Pqs = quasi-static pressure - psi

td = pulse duration for the reflected pressure - sec

T_n = natural period-sec.

 μ = ductility ratio = $\frac{Xm}{Xe}$


Xm = maximum deflection - in.

Xe = elastic deflection - in.

r_y = ultimate resistance of member - psi

The structural analysis considers the following areas for loading and structural response:

- 1. The cover plate is allowed to deform to the reuseable limit where the ductility ratio $\mu = x_m/x_e$ is less than or equal to $6(\mu \le 6)$
- The side plates should not buckle under the dynamic reaction load produced by the blast loading.
- 3. The cover plate shearing through the side plates.
- 4. The side plates shearing through the suppressive shield wall.



Each shield category was analyzed separately and the results for Shield Group 3 are presented below.

Shield Group 3

1. Deflection of Cover Plate

The protective box for this shield group is subjected to the following pressure levels and has the indicated dimensions.

Pressure Levels

$$P_r = 3198 \text{ psi}$$

$$P_{qs} = 187 \text{ psi}$$

Dimensions

a = 10 in.Cover Plate:

b = 20 in.

t = 1.0 in.

Side Plates:

h = 8 in. Material: Mild Steel, F_{ty} KSI = 36 t = 1.0 in. (Ref. 7, Page 2-S) F_{tu} KSI = 55

To evaluate the ductility ratio (u) the following parameters may be evaluated.

$$C_1 P_m = P_r - P_{qs} = 3011 psi$$

$$C_{2} P_{m} = P_{qs} = 187 psi$$

The pulse duration (t,) can be computed from the following equation

$$t_{d} = 2i/P_{r} \tag{2}$$

substituting into equation (2)

$$t_{d} = 0.000375 \text{ sec.}$$

The natural frequency **f** for the cover plate with short edge a, long edge b and thickness t; all edges simply supported can be calculated from the following equations. (Ref. 8, Page 579)

$$f = \frac{K_1}{2\pi} \sqrt{\frac{Dg}{wa^4}}$$
 (3)

and $T_n = 1/f$

where:

f = natural frequency, 1/sec

 $T_n = natural period-sec$

 $K_1 = \text{constant for aspect ratio of plate } (\frac{a}{b})$

g = gravitational acceleration - 386 in/sec.²

w = cover plate weight - 1bs.

a = short edge - in.

 $D = Et^3/[12(1-v^2)] - in. - 1bs.$

 $E = modulus of elasticity = 30 \times 10^6 psi$

v = Poissons Ratio = .27

t = thickness of plate - inches

For the given dimensions a and b; $\frac{a}{b} = 0.5$ and $K_1 = 12.45$

Making the appropriate substitutions into equation (3)

$$f = 1202 t/sec$$

with
$$T_n = \frac{1}{f} = \frac{.00083}{t}$$
 sec

For t = 1.0 in.

$$T_n = 0.00083 \text{ sec.}$$

The resistance of the member (r_v) can be computed from the following

$$r_y = Rm/ab$$
 (4)

where Rm = total load member can take-lbs.

For a simply supported plate where the ratio of short to long side $\frac{a}{b}$ = 0.5 the total load Rm may be obtained from the following equation (Ref. 6, Table 6.2A)

$$Rm = \frac{1}{a} (12 \text{ M}_{p}f_{a} + 9.0 \text{ M}_{p}f_{b})$$

$$Where \quad M_{p}f_{a} = F_{dy}Z_{a}$$

$$M_{p}f_{b} = F_{dy}Z_{b}$$

$$F_{dy} = \text{dynamic yield strength of the material-psi}$$

$$Z_{a} = \text{plastic section modulus about short edge}$$

$$Z_{b} = \text{plastic section modulus about long edge}$$

$$(5)$$

For plates the plastic section modulus is 1.5 times the elastic section modulus (Ref. 9, Page 31)

Therefore Za = 1.5 Zae

The elastic section modulus is:

$$Zae = \frac{I}{C} = \frac{1}{12} at^3 = at^2$$

$$\frac{t}{2}$$

and
$$Z_{be} = b t^2$$

The dynamic yield strength of the material is related to the yield strength of the material by the equation (Ref. 9, Page 16)

$$Fdy = 1.1 Fty$$

Making the appropriate substitutions into equation (5) yields

$$Rm = 2.97 \times 10^5 t^2$$
 (1bs.)

and
$$r_y = Rm/ab$$

$$r_y = 1485t^2$$
 (psi)

Substituting the values of C_1 P_m , C_2 P_m , r_y , T_n and t_d into equation (1) yields:

$$\begin{vmatrix}
\frac{3011}{1485(1)^{2}} \\
\frac{.00083\sqrt{2} - 1}{\pi(.000375)}
\end{vmatrix}^{2} \qquad \frac{187}{1485(1)^{2}} = 1$$

solving for u yields

 μ = 5.4 which is < 6 for reusable members

Now $\mu = xm/xe$

The elastic deflection Xe can be determined from the equation

$$Xe = \underline{Rm}$$

$$Ke$$
(6)

where for $\frac{a}{b} = .5$

Ke = spring constant =
$$\frac{216\text{EIa}}{a^2}$$
 (Ref. 6, Table 6.2A)

Making appropriate substitutions this reduces to

$$Ke = \frac{18Et^3}{a}$$

substituting appropriate values into equation (6)

$$Xe = 0.0055 in.$$

with u = Xm/Xe

$$Xm = 0.030 in.$$

The total load dynamic reaction may be computed by determining the dynamic reactions at the edges of the cover plate.

For a width to length ratio (a/b) of 0.5 the dynamic reactions are

$$Va = .04P + .09R$$

 $Vb = .09P + .28R$
(Ref. 6. Table 6.2A)

where R = maximum resistance - 1b.

P = pressure loading at time of max. structural response - 1b.

The pressure loading P is dependent upon the relative values of t_d and t_m (the time to maximum deflection) (Ref. 10)

for Tm < td

$$P = \left(\frac{t_{d} - T_{m}}{t_{d}}\right) \quad P_{r} \text{ ab } + Pqs \text{ ab}$$
 (8)

for $T_m > t_d$

$$P = Pqs$$
 ab (9)

The time to maximum deflection can be approximated from the equation

 $T_{m} = i/r_{u}$

where i = impulse - psi-sec

 $r_u = r_y = ultimate resistance - 1bs.$

with i = .6 psi - sec.

 $r_u = 1485t^2$ (1bs.)

 $T_{m} = 0.0004 \text{ sec.}$

since $t_d = .000375$ sec.

 $T_m > t_d$

and P = Pqs ab

substituting for Pqs, a and b yields

P = 37,400 lbs.

 $R_m = 297, 000$ 1bs.

Substituting values of P and Rm into equation (7) yields:

Va = 28226 lbs.

 $Vb = 86526 \ 1bs.$

These are the reaction forces along lengths a and b. The total loading is:

$$V_t = 2V_a + 2 V_b$$

$$V_t = 229,504 \text{ lbs.}$$


2. Buckling of Side Plates

The buckling of the side plates supporting the cover plate are analyzed the following method. Each side plate is assumed to be simply supported all edges a or b and clamped along the edges h. End loading by the reaction fo are applied along edges a or b.

Consider a plate of thickness t_s end loaded by a force, V_b .

Let $\sigma' = \text{critical unit compressive stress to buckle}$ the plate (Ref. 8, Page 550)

then
$$\sigma' \approx K \frac{E}{1-v^2} \left(\frac{ts}{b}\right)^2$$



where K = constant dependent upon the span to height ratio (b/h or a/h

$$E = modulus of elasticity = 30 x $10^6 psi$$$

$$v = Poissons ratio = .27$$

$$t_s$$
 = side wall thickness = 1.0 in.

For h = 8 in, b = 20 in;
$$\frac{h}{b}$$
 = .4 and K = 7.76

Substituting into equation (10)

$$\sigma_{b} = 627,764 \text{ psi}$$

The actual compressive stress is

$$J_b = \frac{V_b}{bts}$$
 or

$$\sigma_{b}$$
 = 4326 psi $< \sigma_{b}'$

Likewise for h = 8 in, a = 10 in;
$$\frac{h}{a}$$
 = .8 and K = 6.00 and $\sigma'_a = 1,941,538$ psi $\sigma_a = 2823$ psi $\langle \sigma'_a \rangle$

Therefore, none of the side plates will buckle

3. Shearing of Cover Plate Through the Side Plates

The shearing of the cover plate through the side plates is analyzed using the following method.

The total load on the plate is V_t supported

by the shear area A where

$$A = 2 t (a + b)$$

The shear stress is

$$S_D = V_t/A \tag{11}$$

Substituting $V_t \approx 229504$ lbs.

$$a = 10$$
 in.

$$b = 20 in.$$

$$t = 1.0 in.$$

$$SD = 3825 \text{ psi}$$

The allowable shear stress is the dynamic shear stress of the material given by the equation (Ref. 9, Page 17)

$$Fdv = .55 Fdy$$

with
$$Fdy = 39600 psi$$

$$Fdv = 21780 psi$$

$$S_D < Fdv$$

Therefore, the cover plate will not shear through the side plates

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4. Shearing of Protective Box Through Suppressive Shield Wall

Assume the wall is in double shear

Shear Stress =
$$S_W = \frac{V}{Aw}$$

(12) Side Plate
Suppressive Shield
Wall

where V = dynamic load Va or Vb

$$A_W = 2 a t_W \text{ or } 2 bt_W$$

For
$$V_a = 28226 \text{ lbs.}$$

For
$$V_b = 86526$$

$$a = 10 in.$$

$$b = 20 in.$$

$$t_W = 1.0 in.$$

$$t_w = 1.0 in.$$

$$Swb = 2163 psi$$

By inspection Swa < Fdv

Therefore the protective box will not be pushed through the wall of the suppressive shield.

Analysis of the protective box for Shield Groups 4, 5, and 81MM follow the same method as Shield Group 3. All three final Shield Groups have an a/b ratio equal to 1 which provides a different factor of K for the natural frequency computation and a different equation for the total load (Rm) the material can carry.

For a/b = 1, Factor K for natural frequency T_n is K = 19.7 (Ref. 8, Pg. 579)

$$R_m = \frac{12}{a} (M_{pfa} + M_{pfb}), V_a = V_b = .07P + .18R$$

Spring Constant
$$K_e = 271 \frac{EIa}{a^2}$$

Factor K for buckling analysis is K = 5.8(Category 4)

K = 8.0 (Category 5)

K = 5.79 (Category 81 MM)

Analytical results are presented in tabular form (Figure 23) for all four shield groups.

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X _m (1n)	0.030	0.0019	0.011	0.0034					
×E					u with Box	8.8	3.1	0.4	35
(10) x	0.0055	0,0031	0.014	0.0056		~			
1	5.40	09.0	0.79	0.61	Original	24.2	3.4	0.0	04
ry (1bs)	1485t ²	594£	594t ₂	594£ ²	Notes	Swa < Fdv Swb < Fdv Sp < Fdv	Swa < Fdv Swb < Fdv Sp < Fdv	Swa < Fdv Swb < Fdv Sp < Fdv	Swa C Fdv Swb C Fdv SD C Fdv
Rm (psi)	2.97X 10 ⁵ t ²	2.376X 10 ⁵ t ²	2.376X 10 ⁵ t ²	2.376X 10 ⁵ t ²	Swb (psi)	2163	2869	719	1600
T _n (sec)	0.00083	0.00093	0.0042	0.0017	Swa (psi)	1411	2869	674	1600
td (sec)	0.000375	0.000274	0.000223	0.000377	F _{dv} (ps1)	21780	21780	21780	21780
(1n)	1.0	2.17	0.43	1.23	S _D (pst)	3825	5535	1150	3188
ts (1n)	1.0	0.75	0.50	0.50	Ub (psi)	4326	16604	1150	7869
h (in)	00	12.25	7.5	12.5	Oa (psi)	2823	16604	1150	7869
(1n)	1.0	2.25	05.0	1.25	0, (ps1)	627764 2823	263928 16604	161795	117099
b (11)	50	20	20	50	σ', (ps1)	1941538	263928	161795	117099
a (1n)	10	20	50	20	Vt (1bs.)	229504	996274	46016	318776
1 psi-msec	009	194	55	115	V _b (1bs.)	86526	249068 996274	11504	78694
Pqs (ps1)	187	94	53	28	Va (1bs.)	28226	249068	11504	78694
Pr (pst)	3198	1464	667	610	Tm (sec)	0.004	0,000065	0.00037	0.000128
Shield	8	4	5	8 INW	Shield	3	4	5	811994

Nomenclature		
Pr - reflected pressure - psi	t = cover plate thickness-in.	Tn = cover plate natural period-sec
Pqs = quasi-static pressure - psi	h = side plate height-in.	Rm - total load member can take - lbs.
1 - blast field impulse - psi msec.	ts = side plate thickness-in.	$r_y = ultimate resistance of member-psi.$
a = cover plate width - in.	ty = equivalent suppressive shield wall thickness-in.	<pre>p = ductility ratio</pre>
b - cover plate length - in.	td = pulse duration for the reflected pressure-sec.	Xe = elastic deflertion - in.
Km = maximum deflection - in.	o' = critical unit compressive stress to buckle side a plate of width a - psi	Edv = dynamic shear stress of the material-psi
Im - time to maximum deflection -sec	<pre>Ob = critical unit compressive stress to buckle side</pre>	Swa = shearing stress in suppressive shield wall due to dynamic reaction along width a-psi
Va = dynamic reaction along width a-lba.	Ga = actual compressive stress in side plate of width	Swb = shearing stress in suppressive shield wall due to
V _b = dynamic reaction along length b-1bs	V_b = dynamic reaction along length b-lbs σ_b = actual compressive stress in side plate of length b-ps.	dynamic reaction stong tength o-ps.
Vt - total dynamic reaction - 1bs.	Sp = shearing stress in cover plate due to total	

Figure 23. Design Chart for Utility Boxes

APPENDIX C - CALCULATIONS FOR VACUUM LINE PENETRATION

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Vacuum Line Penetration Analysis

The analytical approach taken to insure the structural integrity of the vacuum line is to compute the energy of the blast loading imposed upon the vacuum line and equate this value to:

- 1. The amount of shear strain energy available in the flange of the vacuum line (to the material yield point).
- 2. The amount of shear strain energy available in the shear area of the suppressive shield wall supporting the vacuum line flange (to the material yield point).

The force computed by equating the strain energies is used to evaluate the shear stress in the respective structural members. The computed shear stress is compared to the allowable dynamic shear stress to ascertain the structural integrity of the members.

The results presented below are for a particular shield (81 mm shield) and are considered conservative for reuseable members due to the fact that components are designed to preclude plastic deformation.

81MM Suppressive Shield

Consider the energy in the blast environment

with
$$P_r = 610 \text{ psi}$$


with
$$P_r = 610 \text{ psi}$$

 $t_d = 0.000377 \text{ sec.}$

The energy is (Ref. 11)

$$E = \frac{\text{(Hme)}^2}{2m}$$

where m = mass of the loaded structure



Waste Disposal Line Weight = 120 lbs.

$$m = 3.73 \text{ lb-sec}^2/\text{ft.}$$

Substituting into the energy equation yields

$$E = 12.35$$
 ft. - 1b. = 148.2 in. - 1b.

1. <u>Vacuum line flange</u> - The flange of the line bears against the suppressive shield wall (Shear Area 1). The shear strain energy in the collar is:

$$U = \frac{F^2 L}{2AG}$$

where

L = shear length (in.)

 $A = \text{shear area (in.}^2)$

F = imposed force (1bs.)

G = modulus of rigidity (psi)

Equating the energy of the blast loading to the strain energy yields

$$E = U = \frac{F^{2}L}{2AG}$$
or
$$F = \left(\frac{2EAG}{L}\right)^{1/2}$$
for
$$L = .38 \text{ in.}$$

$$A = \pi(4.75)(.38) = 5.67 \text{ in.}^{2}$$

$$G = 11 \times 10^{6} \text{ psi}$$

$$F = 222500 \text{ lbs.}$$

and the shear stress

$$\sigma_{s} = \frac{F}{A} = 39241 \text{ psi}$$

The dynamic yield shear strength of the flange = 55% Dynamic Yield Tensile strength.

Flange Material: Cast Steel
$$F_y$$
 = 40,000 psi
$$F_{dy}$$
 = 1.1 F_y = 44,000 psi
$$F_{sy}$$
 = .55 F_{dy} = 24,200 psi

The shear stress is beyond the yield strength. However, knowing that the yield force is

$$f_y = 24200/5.67 = 137214 \text{ lb.}$$

and the yield deflection is,

$$x_e = (L)(F_{sy}/G) = .38(\frac{24200}{11x10}6) = .000836 in.$$

It can be shown that the total deflection to absorb the blast loading energy is

$$x_m = \frac{E}{f_v} - \frac{x_e}{2} = .001078 \text{ in.}$$

The ratio $\mu = \frac{x_m}{x_e}$ is 1.29 which is well within the value of 6 which is acceptable for this application.

2. Suppressive Shield Wall - the vacuum line flange imposes a shear load on the suppressive shield wall. (Shear Area 2).

A = shear area =
$$4(7)(.75)$$
 = 21 in.²
L = .75 in.

From
$$F = \left[\frac{2EAG}{L}\right]^{1/2}$$
For
$$A = 21 \text{ in.}^{2} \text{ (square flange)}$$

$$L = 0.75 \text{ in.}$$

$$F = 302144 \text{ lbs.}$$

$$shear stress \sigma_{S} = \frac{F}{A}$$

$$\sigma_{S} = 14388 \text{ psi}$$

Suppressive Shield Wall Material:
$$F_y \approx 36,000~psi$$

$$F_{dy} \approx 1.1~F_y~= 39,600~psi$$

$$F_{sy} \approx .55~F_{dy} = 21780~psi$$

since σ_{s} < F_{sy} , the flange will not yield.

APPENDIX D - DOOR CALCULATIONS

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Design Analysis

1. Shield Group 5 Sliding Door Calculations

The door panel construction contains two sets of 2x2x1/8 inch steel angles, three layers of 16 gage perforated steel plate with 3/16 inch holes on 5/16 inch staggered spacing (32.7% open) and four layers of 16x16 mesh aluminum screen. The effective venting was calculated to be 0.028. The effect mounting the door on track and rollers to slide horizontally has not changed the venting characteristics since no material has been added to cause additional blockage of the panel.

Door Fragmentation Protection

The equivalent metal thickness of the panel assembly to resist fragment penetration, based on the original design parameters, is 3/8 inch. The actual penetration experienced from simulated testing was considered negligible; no penetration of even the first layer of plate was observed. However, to assure that the sliding door installation is equivalent to the original design concept the total metal thickness through possible fragmentation paths was reviewed. This data is tabulated as follows:

Path	Member and Thickness	Total Thickness
Top of Door Panel	Plate 1/4", Track .150", Angle 1/4"	>1/2"
Bottom of Door	Panel Assembly 3/8", Angle 1/4"	5/8"
Sides	WF Beam 7/16", Angle 1/4" (2)	15/16"
3 Inch Diameter Hole for Latch	Panel Assembly 3/8", Bar 1/8"	1/2"

Obviously, there are no places in the installation where the fragmentation is less than the original specified requirement.

There are no cracks or openings between the door and frame when the door is closed and latched.

Track and Trolley

The weight of the door was calculated for the design analysis of the Category 5 shield dated April, 1975 and is 871 pounds. The following items are specified for the track and trolleys:

Item		Rating
McMaster Carr No	o. 1215A15 Trolley (2 Used)	800 lb.
McMaster Carr No	o. 12D7A26 Track	800 1ь.


The door weight exceeds the rating by 71 pounds (8.8%) which is considered negligible, since an industrial rating of at least 4 to 1 is used for this hardware. The next size rating for the hardware would be for a 1200 pound door and may present mounting difficulties due to the much larger rollers and track. To safeguard the track against the possibility of unforeseen deflection, the track hangers have been increased to eight, spaced a maximum of 20 inches apart. The manufacturers specification for hanger spacing is 24 inches; therefore, the track support as designed will have an increased amount of strength. Because of this smaller spacing, the bending moment on the track will be reduced by approximately 16 percent. Track deflection will also be reduced. Since deflection is proportional to the fourth power of the spacing, the percentage reduction is approximately:

$$\begin{cases} . \% \text{ RED} = \frac{1_1^4 - 1_2^4}{1_1^4} \times 100 = \frac{(24)^4 - (20)^4}{(24)^4} \times 100 = 51.7\% \end{cases}$$

The track system is considered to be adequate based on these design assumptions.

T-Bolt Hanger and Plate

The door hangs on two trolleys. The connection is by means of two 3/4 - 10 threaded studs and sliding "T"-nut:



3/4 - 10 stud root area = 0.302 in²

Stress =
$$\frac{871}{2 \times .302}$$
 = 1442 psi (very low)

Factor of Safety =
$$\frac{60,000}{1,442}$$
 = 41.

"T"-block shear stress on 7/16" x 1-1/2" portion:

Stress =
$$\frac{871}{2 \times 2 \times .4375 \times 1.5}$$
 = 331 psi (very low)

The "T"-bolt hanger assembly is very conservatively designed and has very low stresses in the critical areas.

Door Latch Assembly

Two pull clamps, rated at 1000 pounds each, are used to pull and latch the door against the frame in the sliding (closed) position. In the event of an explosion, the initial and quasi-static blast pressure loads will act towards the door frame. It has been shown during actual tests that the frame safely supports the suppressive panels.

Calculate the force required to pull door closed:

F = u N, where: u is the frictional coefficient (0.75 for dry steel)

N is the normal force on the "T"-slot bearing surface

F is the frictional force

 $F = (.75 \times 871) = 653.25$ pounds

The clamps are adequate for this function and have a good reserve of force available for latching the door.

Personnel Safety Considerations


As with any moving device, due precautions must be taken by personnel to avoid catching hands, fingers or equipment between door and frame when sliding the door closed. The handle is large enough and spaced away from the panel to avoid this problem so long as the hands are kept on the device. It is recommended that a warning sign be attached on the door, or the edges of the door be painted with a safety stripe, according to customary AAP procedures.


References

EM-TM-76001, Category 5 Suppressive Shield, May 1975, D. M. Koger and G. L. McKown

Design Analysis of a Suppressive Structure for a Category 5 Operational Shielding Application, April 1975, R. E. Wandrey

Manual of Steel Construction, AISC, Seventh Edition





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(2) Shield Group 3 Door Calculations

SUBJECT: DOOR BEST AVAILABLE COPY Mp= f sp= 42000(1.95)= 81, 900"# M= wl2 w=ry $r_y = \frac{8M}{L^2} = \frac{8(81,900)}{(57.75)^2} = 235.47$ (PROVIDED) T= 0.64 L2 / WEI $T = 0.64(52.75)\sqrt{\frac{5.7}{12(386)(33)(10^6)(2.52)}}$ $\begin{bmatrix} C_1 P_M \\ \frac{r_q}{L} \end{bmatrix}^2 + \frac{C_2 P_M}{\frac{r_q}{L}} = 1$ T= . 00718 TRY W = 110 $\frac{\begin{bmatrix} .9483(4513.32) \\ 235.47 \end{bmatrix}^{2} + \frac{.0517(4513.32)}{235.47} = 1$ F1 = T 12M-1 $F_1 = \frac{7.18}{\pi (.32)} \sqrt{2(0)-1} = 105.69$ $\left(\frac{18.176}{F_1}\right)^2 + \frac{9909}{F_2} = 1$ Fz= T 1-1 1-1 1+7 (T) $F_2 = \frac{7.18}{11(1404)} \sqrt{\frac{2(10)-1}{1+17}} + \frac{1 - \frac{1}{2(110)}}{1+17(\frac{7.18}{1404})}$ $\left(\frac{18.176}{105.69}\right)^2 + \frac{.9909}{1.016} = 1$ 1.005 2 1 Fz= 1.016

110 M IS TO HIGH in REVISE DOOR SECTION

```
UTP5. 09:57 ATL VED 12/03/75.

ENTER PM.C1.C2.T1.T2; PERIOD. Door Length 52.75
 ENTER PM.CI.C2.TI.T2; PERIOD.
INPUT: 00190
INPUT:00190
 INPUT: 00190
7 4504.5,.9483,.0517,.00032,1.404,.007147
 ENTER INCREMENT OF MU ( . 1, 1, ETC )
 INPUT:00220 ? 5
  MU RY
 1.00 875.03
6.00 347.48
11.00 300.04
16.00 280.43
21.00 269.48
26.00 , 262.42
76.00 240.55
81.00 239.72 -
86.00 238.98
  91.00 238.30
 96.00 237.69
01.00 237.12
 06.00 236.60
 MINNING TIME: 3.1 SECS I/O TIME : 1.7 SECS
```

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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	CHECKED BY:	DATE
ADD COVER TRS TO DOG	or BMs (S3X5.7	To REDUCE M
TRY COVER F	ts 11/2" wide x 1/4"	THICK B
TOTAL I = I BM + I B = 2.5	$52 + 2\left[\frac{51^{3} + ad^{2}}{12}\right]$ $52 + 2\left[\frac{1.5(.25)^{3}}{12} + .375(1.62)\right]$	3)
I ₇ = 4.6		
Sp = 4	$\frac{.50}{.75} \left(\frac{1.95}{1.68} \right) = 2.99$	w ³ =
Mp = f Sp = 42,000 (2.99) =		
$Mp = \frac{WL^2}{8} w = ry$ $ry =$	$\frac{8(125,580)}{(52.75)^2} = 361$	#/LN. IN
T= 0.64 L2 V W GEI		1.28(z) = 8.26
$T = 0.64 (52.75)^2 \sqrt{\frac{8.26}{12(386)(30)(10^6)(4.50)}}$	0065	
$ \left[\frac{C_1 P_m}{\frac{y_4}{F_1}}\right]^2 + \frac{C_2 P_m}{\frac{y_4}{F_2}} = 1 $	TRY u=	
	F1= T 1211-1	$=\frac{6.5}{\pi(.32)} (2(7)-1=25.3)$
$\begin{bmatrix} .9483 (4513.32) \\ \hline \frac{361}{F_1} \end{bmatrix}^{2} + \frac{.0517 (4513.32)}{561} = 1$	F2= I 12u-1 +	1+,7(元)
$\left(\frac{11.85}{F_1}\right)^2 + \frac{.646}{F_2} = 1$		+ 1-2(7) 1+17 (615)
$\left(\frac{11.85}{23.31}\right)^2 + \frac{.646}{.93} = 1$	Fz=.93	
.953≤1 OK Nº	6.5	

UTP5 15:01 ATL WED 12/03/75

ENTER PM.CI.CZ.TI.TZ.PERIOD ...

NEW DOOR MEMBER

INPUT:00190
7 4504.5,.9483,.0517,.00032,1.404,.0064

ENTER INCREMENT OF MU (. 1, 1, ETC)

INPUT: 00220

'MU . RY 939.92 1.00 2.00 570.94 3.00 469.54 4.00 418.47 5.00 386.84 365.01 6.00 7.00 - 348.91 8.00 336.47 326.53 9.00 318.38 10.00 311.56 11.00 305.77 12.00 13.00 300.78 296.43 14.00 15.00 292.60 16.00 289.20 17.00 286.16 18.00 283.42 19.00 280.94 20.00 278.69

U.S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:	
	CHECKED BY:	DATE:	

CALCULATE REACTION AT END OF VERTICAL

$$V_{d} = .38 R_{m} + 0.12 F$$

$$V_{d} = .38(249.7 \times 52.75 \times 1.43)$$

$$+ .12(52.75 \times 163 \times 1.43)$$

$$V_{d} = .8633 \#$$

$$V_{d} = .38(349.7 \times 52.75 \times 163 \times 1.43)$$

$$Y_{g} = \frac{9.20(42,000)(2.57)}{1.43(52.75)^{2}}$$

$$V_{g} = .3633 \#$$

$$V_{g} = .38(349.7 \times 52.75)^{2}$$

$$V_{g} = .38(349.7 \times 52.75)^{2}$$

$$V_{g} = .38(33 \times 1.43)$$

$$V_{g} = .38(349.7 \times 52.75)^{2}$$

$$V_{g} = .38(33 \times 1.43)$$

$$V_{g} = .38(349.7 \times 52.75)^{2}$$

SHEAR CAPACITY OF BM = 12.75" SEE SH. 10

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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	CHECKED BY:	DATE:
TRY LARGER BEAM IN PLATES WILL NOT BE K	DOOR SO THAT EQUIRED.	Corer
TRY 85×10 NIp= f5p= 42,000 (5.67) = 238,	$P_{m} = 3(3150)$ $C_{1} = .9483$ $C_{2} = .0517$) = 9450
$Mp = \frac{\omega \ell}{8}$ $r_y = \omega$ r_y	$= \frac{8(234,140)}{(52.75)^2} = 68$	84.66 #/LW. M.
T= 0.64 L2 V W GEI		
$T = 0.64 (52.75)^2 \sqrt{\frac{10}{12(386)(30)(16)12.3}}$	= .0043	
$\left[\frac{C_1 P_m}{r_q}\right]^2 + \frac{C_2 P_m}{r_q} = 1$	$F_1 = \frac{T}{\pi t d_1} \sqrt{2n}$	
	$F_1 = \frac{2.3}{11(.32)} \sqrt{2}$	u-1 = 4.28 [2u-1
$\frac{9483(9450)}{684.66} + \frac{.0517(9480)}{684.66} = 1$ $\frac{4.2812n-1}{2n}$	$F_2 = 1 - \frac{1}{2\mu}$	$= \frac{2u-1}{2m}$
	REACTION (Dynamic)
$\frac{9.35}{2u-1} + \frac{.714(2u)}{2u-1} = 1$	V= .38 Rm +.12	
	V = •38(684-66)(60)	+ .12 (60 X 163 X =
$\frac{9.35 + 1.427u}{2u - 1} = 1$	V= 19,131#	
9.35 + 1.427m = 2m - 1	BEAM CAPACIT	Y
10.35 = .573 W M = 18	Y= 5(.214)(25,00	(a) = 26,750 EZ

FEALY

TP2A 09:54 ATL VED 12/17/75

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ENTEP PM, C1, C2, T1, T2

PREUT:00320 . 9450,.9483,.0517,.00032,1.404

IN YOU WANT PROGRAM TO CALCULATE T AND RY?

PUT:00380

ENTER 1 FOR SIMPLY SUFPORTEL, 2 FOR FIXED ENLS

INFUT: 0C430

ENTER V.XI.XZ.XL.FIY.FMOL

IMPUT: 06480
7 . 933, 12.3, 5.67, 52.75, 42000, 300000000 S5 X 10

1 1 17 --- 1

TY= 6.8466386648E+C2 T= 4.2539037109E-03

T1/T= 7.4698224235E-C2 T2/T= 3.2773345883E+C2

ENTER DEL

INTUT: C0930

ITEC= 1 CTEC= 2 F1= 2.5245989198F+C1 F2= 9.7598C98196E-C1 C1FM/EY/F1

0.2688

C2PM/FY/F2 C.7311 SUM C • 9999

15.050C

ENTER 1 FOR SIMPLY SUPPORTED, 2 FOR FIXEL ENLS

INPLT:00430

ENTER V.XI.XZ.XL.FEY, EMOD

INPUT:00480 ? 1.229,15.2,7.42,52.75,42000,30000000

FY= 8.9597987466E+02 T= 4.6808411506E-03

TI/T= 6.8363781144E-02 / TZ/T= 2.9994608977E+02 ENTER CEL

INPUT: CCE30

IFEC= JPEC=

1.5686316277E+01 F1= ?= 9.2046377771E-01

C1FM/RY/F1 C2PM/FY/F2 0.4C66 0.5924

. 0.5924 . C.999C

MIZ

6.1750

THITEF I FOR SIMPLY SUPPORTED, 2 FOR FIXED ENDS

INFUT:00430 ? 5

6.0 SECS 1/0 TIME : FINNING TIME:


FEADY EYE

OFF AT 10:01

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U.S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS



U. S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	CHECKED BY:	DATE:
CHECK UNSUPPORTED	LENGTH OF BEN	ims IN DOOR
THICKNEYS FLG. \ \F	$\frac{2}{9} = \frac{52.2}{\sqrt{42}} = 8.05$	53X 5.7
1.08 = 4.15 ≤ s	8.05: Qualifies F	OR COMPACT SECTION
COMPRESSION FLANGE TO NOT TO EXCEED	$\frac{76 bt}{1 \text{Fy}} = \frac{76 (2.33)}{\sqrt{42}}$ NOR	= 27.3 (CONTROLS)
7	$\frac{20,000}{d_{Af}} = \frac{20,000}{(z.33)(.26)} = \frac{3}{42}$	— = 96.16

BRACE DOOR BEAM AT MIDPOINT LATERALLY

HND FORM 28 16 MAY 1968

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APPENDIX E - CALCULATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING PENETRATION

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CALCULATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING PENETRATION

For the purposes of this analysis, the Shield Group 81MM has been considered. The procedure is, of course, applicable to all of the shield groups, and is described as follows;

- 1. Determine the required number of air changes per unit of time, for the particular operation in question. In the absence of specific requirements, we will assume that 2 complete air changes per hour will be provided. This is consistant with industrial practice for places which are not occupied during operations.
- Calculate the area of the exhaust required to accommodate the required volume of air at a reasonable flow rate.

The area required for the exhaust is given by

$$A_{\text{vent}} = Q_{\text{v}}$$

where

A_{vent} = area of the exhaust, ft.²

 $Q = flow rate, ft.^3/min.$

v = flow velocity, ft/min.

For a shield volume of 2500 ft. 3 and a flow velocity of 400 ft/min (typical for air movement systems), the exhaust area required is

$$A_{\text{vent}} = 0.208 \text{ ft.}^2$$

3. Determine the height of the exhaust stack above the building which is required to limit the overpressure on the surrounding structure to an acceptable level. The explosive hazard for the 81MM shield is defined as the simultaneous detonation of three 81MM mortar rounds. This represents a Fano Equivalent of 4.2 lbs of high explosive.

The scaled venting factor is given in Reference 12 as

where,

$$A = A_{vent}$$
 ft.²

V = Volume of the space confining explosion, ft.³

For the case in question,

$$\frac{A}{2/3} = \frac{.208}{2/3} = .001$$
V (2500)

For the purposes of this analysis, overpressure of 1 psi will be assumed. The designer must select the allowable overpressure on the surrounding building based on the design criterion for the particular application. From Figure 16, for a peak positive pressure (P_{so}) of 1 psi, and a scaled venting factor $\frac{\mathbf{A}}{2/3}$ of .001, the scaled distance, $\frac{\mathbf{R}}{1/3}$ is 7.5.

R = exhaust stack height above the structure, ft.

W = Fano Equivalent = 4.2 lbs. (Ref. 13)

Solving for R,

$$1/3$$
 $1/3$ $1/3$ $R = 7.5$ $W = 7.5$ (4.2) = 12 ft.

A 12 ft. high stack will be the minimum required.

4. Calculate the required wall thickness of the stack assuming it is circular in cross-section.

<u>Inside the suppressive shield</u>: The criteria for the portion of the exhaust which is inside the shield is that it have at least the equivalent fragment penetration resistance of the shield itself.

For the 81mm shield, this thickness is 1.25 inches.




Figure 24-Design chart for vent area required to limit pressures at any range outside a 4-wall cubicle.

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Outside the suppressive shield: The design criteria in this case is that the stack must withstand the side-on blast pressure caused by the explosion inside the shield.

The scaled distance, Z is given by

$$Z = \frac{R_{H}}{W 1/3}$$

where R_H = the half width of the shield = 7 ft. W = Fano Equivalent = 4.2 lbs.

Substituting these values,

$$Z = 4.34 \text{ ft/1b.}^{1/3}$$

From Goodman, H. J., 1960, "Compiled Free-Air Blast on Bare Spherical Pentolite" BRL Report No. 1092, APG, Md., the side-on blast pressure, $P_{so} \approx 47.3$ psi for a Z = 4.34 ft/1b^{1/3}. The hoop stress in a thin round tube subjected to uniform internal pressure is given by:

$$C = (pr)$$

where

O = hoop tension, psi

p = uniform internal pressure, psi = 47.3 psi

r = radius of the tube, in.

t = thickness of the tube, in.

Assuming an allowable stress of = 20,000 psi, the thickness may be expressed as:

$$t = \frac{Pr}{O} = \frac{47.3}{20,000} (r) = 2.365 \times 10^{-3} (r)$$

For a stack area of $A_{vent} = .208$ ft.², the radius, r, is determined by

$$r = \sqrt{\frac{A_{\text{vent}}}{\pi}} = \sqrt{\frac{.208}{\pi}} = .26 \text{ ft} = 3.12 in.}$$

The minimum exterior stack thickness required to withstand the pressure is thus,

$$t = 2.365 \times 10^{-3} \times 3.12 = .007 in.$$

Criteria other than pressure from an internal explosion will probably control the design of the stack outside the shield.

APPENDIX F - EXAMPLE MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION

This appendix presents typical maintenance instructions applicable to the Shield Groups.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION

DATE

SUPPRESSIVE SHIELD
SHIELD GROUP

CEDURE NO.	PCN NO.		E CHANGI		RESPONSIBLE UNIT	REVISION N
		DATE	DATE			
CEDURE TITLE		,			PROCEDURE TY	
SUPPRESSIVE SHI	ELD GROUP				Preventativ	e Mainten
		A	UTHORIZATION			-
ORIGINA	TOR	DATE	RESP. U	NH MGR./SUPV	DATE	_
QA		DATE		TECHNICAL	DAYE	
					DATE	
SAFET	14	DATE	DOCUMEN	TATION CONTROL	DATE	
ASON FOR CHANGE:						
			REMARKS			
						*
-						
		*				
W. W.						



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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

This procedure contains the preventative maintenance instructions necessary to ensure the proper operation of the Group ___ suppressive shield as listed herein.

1.2 DESCRIPTION

The Suppressive Shields are operational barricades consisting of structural steel and vented composite walls used for containing hazardous munitions plant operations. These shields protect personnel, equipment and facilities against fragments, blast overpressure, and flame/fireball from accidental explosions and reactions.

1.3 SCOPE

1.3.1 General

The maintenance instructions and operations presented in this document, when performed at the time intervals indicated, provide the basis for periodic preventative maintenance of the suppressive shield.

1.3.2 Maintenance Tasks Included in This Document

The maintenance instruction will be performed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 7.0 of this procedure. The suppressive shields listed in the Maintenance Performance and Location Check Lists, paragraph 8, will be inspected periodically as follows:

- a. Bi-monthly, paragraph 7.1
- b. Semi-annual, paragraph 7.2
- c. Annual, paragraph 7.3

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 DOCUMENTS

2.1.1 (To Be Determined)



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2.2 DRAWINGS

(List applicable drawings)

2.3 SPECIFICATIONS

(List applicable drawings)

- 3.0 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
- 3.1 DEFINITIONS

(List as required)

3.2 ABBREVIATIONS

(List as required)

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. Personnel assigned to perform these maintenance instructions shall be responsible for the safety of personnel and equipment, and will be responsible for following this procedure as outlined herein.
- b. Minor adjustments will be accomplished at time of inspection.
- c. Rework requiring parts, special effort (in addition to routine), and fabrication shall be documented by the performing organization for corrective action. These reports will be forwarded to the work control center for scheduling and implementation of the corrective maintenance.

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- 5.0 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
- 5.1 SPECIAL TOOLS/TEST EQUIPMENT
- Resistance measuring device (approved instrument)
- b. Test leads, clips, and surface plates
- c. Optical transit
- 5.2 EQUIPMENT
- a. Standard hand tools
- b. Ladder
- 5.3 MATERIAL
- a. Safety approved dry graphite lubricant or equivalent
- b. Safety approved solvent, as required
- c. Shop rags
- 6.0 PREREQUISITES
- 6.1 EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION

Normal

- 6.2 FUNCTIONAL PREREQUISITES
- a. Advise user of inspection. Determine occupancy and operational status of shield and observe posted regulations in respective area.
- b. Follow standard lock-and-tag procedure and secure for inspection per Safety Manual Regulations.
- c. Advise user when inspection is complete and restored to normal. Discuss with user if unusual or unsatisfactory service conditions have been experienced.

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NOTE: OBSERVE AND COMPLY WITH ALL PLANT AND AREA WARNING SIGNS AND REGULATIONS

7.0 PROCEDURE

Refer to paragraphs 1.0 through 6.0 prior to performing this procedure.

- 7.1 BI-MONTHLY MAINTENANCE TASKS
- 7.1.1 Perform a complete visual inspection of the Suppressive Shield, checking for interior and exterior surfaces.
- a. Worn areas, punctures, cuts, and cracks of the environmental covering of all interior and exterior surfaces.
- b. Cracks and spalling of the concrete surfaces of the roof and foundation slab.
- c. Presence of rust, blistering, or peeling paint.
- d. Condition of conductive floor material.
- e. Condition of electrical ground straps, lightning rods and cables.
- f. Evidence of processed material accumulation on interior surfaces.
- g. Condition of service penetrations.
- h. Condition of interior lighting devices.
- i. Condition of expansion joint calking around foundation.
- 7.1.2 Clean shield and equipment with appropriate solvent and shop rags.
- 7.1.3 Functionally check operation of personnel and process equipment doors.
- 7.1.4 Check operation of all switches, interlocks, and indicator lamps. (Replace lamps as required.)
- 7.1.5 Lubricate moving parts as required.
- 7.2 SEMI-ANNUAL MAINTENANCE TASKS



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- 7.2.1 Check tightness of structural bolts as required.
- 7.2.2 Check tightness of ground strap bolts.
- 7.3 ANNUAL MAINTENANCE TASKS
- 7.3.1 Perform tests for proper electrical resistance and continuity to ground in accordance with USAMC Regulations 385-100, for the following:
- a. Static grounds (equipment)
- b. Conductive floors
- c. Lightning protection system.
- 7.3.2 Perform check for foundation settling of the shielding structure by setting up and sighting the optical transit from pre-established reference points to targets scribed on the exterior shield walls in accordance with detailed Plant Operating Procedures.

 (Number to be provided).
- 8.0 SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
- 8.1 Sample check list for each applicable location and maintenance period follows.

MAINT	MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE AND	ND LOCATION CHECK LIST	
FROCEDURE TITLE	PROCEDURE NO.	LOCATION DATE PERFORMED MAINT FREQ.	REQ.
PARAGRAPH NO.			
CONDITION—→ S	0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0		VERIFICATION
LOCATION		SIGN	SIGNATURES
			- 240
E			TAME TRANSPORT
11			
			-
		PROCEDURE NUMBER	
		REVISION NUMBER	-
11		PAGE CONT'D ON PAGE	
CODES		REMARKS	
S - Satisfactory . U	.U - Unsatisfactory		

APPENDIX G - WELDING PROCEDURE AND QUALIFICATION

This appendix presents an example of a welding procedure which shall be required for the fabrication of the shield penetrations and openings as well as for the basic shield structure. The AWS Structural Welding Code, AWS D1.1-75, is specified for the welding. The quality control and inspection procedures will vary depending upon the critical nature of the weld but AWS1.1-75 contains the required provisions in Section 6 - Inspection.

The following example only illustrates what a welding procedure would consist of and is not meant to be all encompassing. Each situation will require perhaps a slightly different procedure but by specifying the submission of a welding procedure from the shield fabricator, the structural integrity of the shield can be insured.

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8.0	Joint Welding	G-4
9.0	Repairs	G-4
10.0	Qualification of Welders	G-4
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Appendix: Prequalified Joint Welding Procedure Welder Qualification Test Results

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WELDING PROCEDURE

Note: Local regulations and SOP's regarding flame permits prior to welding must be followed. Decontamination of the shield shall be in accordance with the local AAP SOP's, AMCR 385-100 (Safety Manual) and ARMCOM Regulation 385-5 (Contamination, Decontamination, and Disposal).

1.0 APPLICABILITY

All welding shall be performed in accordance with the AWS Structural Welding Code AWS Dl.1-75.

2.0 PROCESSES

- 2.1 Manual Shielded Metal Arc Process (SMAW)
- 2.2 Gas Shielded Metal Arc Process (GMAW)
- 2.3 Gas Shielded Tungsten Arc Process (GTAW)

3.0 POSITIONS

Positions which may be used include flat, vertical, and horizontal.

4.0 JOINT DESIGN

All joints are to be as shown on applicable drawings and are prequalified in accordance with AWS D1.1-75.

5.0 HEAT CONTROL

- 5.1 Any required field preheating to be done with a torch.
- 5.2 Preheat values and interpass temperatures are to be determined from Table 4.2 of AWS D1. 1-75.

6.0 ELECTRODES

- 6.1 The manual shielded metal arc process shall use low hydrogen electrodes of the E7018 type in accordance with AWS A5.1.
- 6.2 The inert gas shielded arc processes shall use wires of the MIL-E70S type which conform to AWS A5.18.
- 6.3 Electrodes used for the SMAW process shall arrive at the site in hermetically sealed containers. After opening, the electrodes shall immediately be placed in ovens held at 250°F minimum. After removal from holding ovens, those not used within four hours shall be redried before use according to paragraph 4.9.2 of AWS D1.1-75.

7.0 PREPARATION OF BASE METALS

- 7.1 Edges may be machined, sawed, ground or flame cut. Flame cut edges need not be ground if smooth, free of gouges, scale and slag.
- 7.2 Prior to fitting, the surfaces of the joints to be welded shall be cleaned of loose scale or other foreign matter for a distance of one-half inch beyond the extremity of welds.

8.0 JOINT WELDING

- 8.1 Weld layer thickness should not exceed 5/16". Each weld layer shall be started at the end of the finishing end of the preceeding layer, except where procedure must be varied to eliminate distortion.
- 8.2 Weld passes are to be cleaned of all slag or other foreign matter before deposition of additional passes.
- 8.3 Arc starts and stops are to be chipped or ground as necessary ton insure sound welding.
- 8.4 Excessive slag and splatter are to be removed from finished welds.
- 8.5 Undercut at the edges of finished welds shall be held to a minimum but not exceed .030" or 10% of thinner members, whichever is less, for more than 5% of the length of any given weld surface.
- 8.6 On completion of welding, the finished joints shall be allowed to cool to room temperature. Mechanical means of cooling shall not be allowed.

9.0 REPAIRS

- 9.1 Excavation of defects may be made by chipping or grinding. The excavated areas shall be beveled in accordance with joint requirements.
- 9.2 All repairs are to be made with the same type electrodes as the original welds.
- 9.3 Inspection of repaired areas shall be in accordance with original requirements.

10.0 QUALIFICATION OF WELDERS

Welders qualified in accordance with Section 5 of AWS D1.1 or with MIL-STD-248 shall be used.

11.0 BASE METALS

- 11.1 Steel plates, shapes, and bars shall conform to ASTM-A36.
- 11.2 Steel tubing shall conform to ASTM-A501.

PREQUALIFIED JOINT WELDING PROCEDURE PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION

elding process anual or machine osition of welding				
elding process anual or machine osition of welding				
anual or machine osition of welding				
osition of welding				
ller metal specificat	ion			,
				Flow
• • •				
•				
		WE	LDING P	ROCEDURE
9 5	Welding (Current	T	
Pass Electrode size		Volts	Travel	Joint Detail
	Amperes	Voits		

WELDER AND WELDING OPERATOR QUALIFICATION TEST RECORD

						tion no	
						Machine	
Position		vertical - if vertic			or downward)		
			FILLER	MEIAL			
						F No	
Is backing st	rip used?						
		e name				gas for gas metal arc or flux	


			Guided Berid	Test Result	3		
	Type	Result		Туре		Result	
	.,,,,						
					Ann. Tota No.	1	
Test conduc					tory lest No		
	per	***************************************	*****************				
		RAD	IOGRAPHIC	TEST RES	ULTS		
Film Identifi- cation	Results	Ren	narks	Film Identifi- cation	Results	Remarks	
Test witness	ed by				Test no		
	per						
			!- ab :	d	e and that the wal	de ware prepared and tested in	
		ents of 5C or D of				ds were prepared and tested in	
				Manufacture	er or Contractor		
				Authorized	by		
				Date			

APPENDIX H


DESIGN ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP 3 SHIELD FOUNDATION

(Note that reference is made to the 1/4 scale category 1 model in the analysis. This scale model shield has been safety approved as the group 3 shield.)

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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
No. 10 Exercises	CHECKED BY: Rm. A	DATE:
CASES FIRE STRUCTED CASE I LONG DURATION	WAL RESPONSE	
$ \begin{array}{c} t_1 \\ t_2 \end{array} >> T \qquad \frac{C_1 P_{ng}}{r_g} \\ \frac{T}{\pi l d_1} \frac{1}{2n-1} + \frac{1-\frac{1}{2n}}{1+1/(\frac{T}{ld})} $	+ \frac{C_2 \frac{r_0}{r_0}}{r_0} \frac{T}{\pi \left[2n-1 + \frac{1}{1+\dots} \]	$\frac{1}{\frac{2\pi i}{\left(\frac{T}{t_{d_1}}\right)}} = 1$
CASE II PURE IMPULSE		
$ \begin{array}{c} t_1 \\ t_2 \end{array} $ $ \begin{array}{c} C_1 P_m \\ \hline $	$ \frac{C_2 P_m}{r_y} = \frac{T}{\pi i d_z \sqrt{2u-1}} $	1
CASE III		
t, CT SHORT DUR	RATION	
tz >T LONG DUR	ATION	
$\left(\frac{\frac{C_{1}P_{m}}{r_{y}}}{\frac{T}{\pi td_{1}}\sqrt{2u-1}}\right)^{2} + \frac{C_{1}P_{m}}{\frac{T}{\pi td_{2}}\sqrt{2u}}$	$\frac{Cz Pm}{ry} = \frac{1-\frac{1}{2L}}{1+.7\left(\frac{T}{Ldz}\right)}$	1

U.S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

	SUBJECT: COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS
	CHECKED BY: GR. M. M. DATE:
	ESTIMATE DESIGN PRESSURE
	FOR CONCRETE ROCE & FOUNDATION
	ASSUME TM 5-1300 TYPE I CONSTENCTION
	90 Xm= tan 2° (67.5")= 2.36"
COAD	BEST AVAILABLE COPY $\frac{\lambda_m}{\lambda_y} = \frac{2.36}{.236} = 10$
7	DEDI AVAILABLE COPY " .736 857.
	E du
	0 .
	t,= .3 Ms t ₂ = 29 ms kent
	TIME = 1404 ms class
	CASE III $C = 38289592$ $A550mE M = 10$
	3991 T= 1/ MS
	c2 = 163' = . 0 408
	3997.
	$\left(\frac{c_1 P_m}{r_y}\right) + \frac{c_2 P_m}{r_y} = \left(\frac{3828}{r_y}\right) + \frac{r_y}{r_y} = 1$
	$\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{2u-1}} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{2u}} = \frac{1}{$
	1+.7(F)
	$\frac{\left(\frac{3824}{ry}\right)^{2} + \frac{163}{ry} = \left(\frac{75.254}{ry}\right)^{2} + \frac{170.38}{ry} = \frac{5663.16}{ry^{2}} + \frac{170.38}{ry} = 1}{ry^{2}}$
	\(\frac{ry}{50.87}\) \(\frac{ry}{4557}\) \(\frac{ry}{4557}\)
	$\frac{50.877}{5663.16 + 170.38 ry = 1}{ry^2 - 170.38 ry + \left(\frac{170.38}{2}\right)^2} = 5663.16 + \left(\frac{170.37}{2}\right)^2$
	. 7
	$(r_y - 85.19)^2 = 5663.16 + 7257.34$
	ry-85.19 = \(\frac{12,920.50}{20.50} = 1/3.67
	ry = 113.67 + 85.19 = 198.86 FOR DESIGN USE ry = 250 P.

HND FORM 28 16 MAY 1968

PAGE Z OF

U.S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:		
	E. WILLIAMS			
	CHECKED BY: Rim th	DATE:		
USE A 1/4 SEGMENT FOR				
PROPERTIES OF A 14	SEGMENT			
	of a			
	ipporto	114		
8	Supposerio	A 10,03		
		.3 100		
	Z h _ pt	y 106.05		
example of the second				
re.	Appr !			
Center Secree	. \			
		1		
= = 11	~ \	4.72		
There of the state	240000	20.76		
5				
00	2,7	1		
	40.522	0.78		
	7 9	6.76		
	. /			
	t _x			
	· ×			
ARC OF SEMICIRCLE	•			
T = 2R 2(476) 107	•			
$\overline{y} = \frac{2R}{\Pi(7:7)} = \frac{2(67.5)}{\Pi(707)} = 60.70$				
AREA OF SEMICIRCLE				
4R 4(67.5)	Va 52			
$\overline{y} = \frac{4R}{3\pi} = \frac{4(67.5)}{3(\pi)(.707)} = 40.52$				
LENGTH OF ARC = TTD = TT (135) = 106.03"				
ANER = TId2 = TI (135)2 3578.	54"			
4(4) 16				
$AREA = \frac{TIO^2}{4(4)} = \frac{TI(135)^2}{16} = 3578.$ $CHORD = 1.414 R = 1.414 (67.5)$	- 95.44			
HND FORM 28 16 MAY 1968		PAGE 3 OF		

U. S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT:	E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: Q.M. A	DATE:
DETERMINE MOM. MAK	ON YIELD LINE	
8438#/IN 8.438#/1		2.5
MVN = 65,345 MV	N= 65, 3 43 IN	
	7	MVN=65,343"N
	MHP	I
	<u>T</u>	Tee
2750		MHP
7 1		
SECTOR		
X X X		
FOUNDATION & ROOF SLA	A-B	
TOTAL AXIAL LOAD = TId 2 (4 LOAD PER INCH = 3,57	$(P) = \frac{\pi (135)^2 (250)}{\sqrt{250}} = 3,$	578, 470
LOAD PER INCH = 3,5%	78,470 = 8,438#/W	
Dervius (A)	(/ 3-2)	
$M_{VN} = \frac{5,150}{1.433} \left(\frac{250}{165} \right) /2 = 6$	5,343" /IN	
Z BN SPACING		
USING EQ 5-23 TAT.	5- /300	
EMN + EMP = ru AC		
ru = 250#/m , A =	= 3578.5 , C = 20.	26"
$E M_{VN} = \frac{65,343}{2} \times 95.44$	= 3,118,168"#	~
E MHP = 95.44 MHP		

SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS	DATE:	
	CHECKED BY: 220.4h	DATE:	

 $EM_{vn} + EM_{Hp} = Y_u AC$ $3,118,168 + 95.44 M_{Hp} = 250(3578.5)(20.26)$ $M_{Hp} = 250(3578.5)(20.26) - 3118,168 = 157,240$

DETERMINE SLAB THICKNESS TM 5-1300 TYPE I SETION

$$bol^2 = M_{HP} \qquad d^2 = \frac{157,240}{1(1156)} = 136.02$$

$$d' = \frac{157,240}{1(1156)} = 136.02$$

$$d' = \frac{1}{1} \frac{1}{$$

U. S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT:	E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: R.M.A.	DATE:
CHECK FOR DIAGONAL TENSION & EXERCT SHEAR.		
$V_{SV} = \frac{Y_M A}{Arc} = \frac{250(3)}{106}$	578.5) = 8437.5	#/12
2-109/fc = 10(.85)		
$\overline{v_n} = \frac{V_{n}}{bd} \qquad d = \frac{84}{60}$	137.5 = 14.04	" CONTROLS
Vd = 0.18 fc 60' d= V.	16 = 54395 =	9.4"
	USE	d= 16
		Tc = 1800
DETERMINE REBAR SIZE	E & SPACING	
REG'D $K_{\mu} = \frac{M_{HP}}{6d^2} = \frac{157}{(1)}$		#/a"
P= 1 (1-VI- 2mku)		8
P = 1 /2.42 (1- VI- 2(12.42)(614)		3
As = p 6d = . coggz(12)(16)	= 1.90 "/FT	and the second
	US= 2 LAYERS 1/2 x1.7664=	.8832
	共30/3"	
	OR# 4 @ 21/2"	
* SMCING CHANGED TO Z'A. DUE	TO OTHER CWGIDERA	TIOUS (SH. 13)

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U.S. ARMY HUNTSVILLE DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT:	E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: A.M. W.	DATE:
CHECK MONTENT CAPACITY		3
$P = \frac{A_5}{6d} = \frac{(.96)^2}{12(16)} = .01$		
a = As dy = 1.92(66, 85(12))	(6250) = 1.99 "	
M PROVIDED = His foly ($\left(d-\frac{a}{2}\right)$	3
M =2696 (66,000)	[16-1.99] = 1,90	01,575" #/FT
		157, 240"# OK
CHECK MOM. CAPACITY @ 5	SUPPORT (MUN)	ISING ONE LAYER
$\alpha = A_5 + d_y = .96 (66)$ $.856 + d_c = .85(12)$	(6250) = . 994	
MPROVIDED = As foly (d- a)		
= .96 (66,000) (16	6.75 - 1994)	#/M "#/M
= 1,061,280 "	175-1714) 14/1 OR 88,440	765, 343

SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	E. WILLIAMS	
	CHECKED BY: R.M. Th	DATE:
DESIGN STIRRUPS		
SHEAR PERMITTED ON CONCRETE		
Vc= \$ [1.9 / F'C + 2500 p]	VCMAx = 2.28 01	FE
= . 85 [1.9 / 5000 + 2500 (.01)]	= 2:28 (.85)	15000
= 135 Psi (USE THIS)	= 137Psi	
USE BRITILE FAILURE MODE M		
MAXIMUM Vu = 100 VTE = 10(.8. MAXIMUM SPACING ON STIRRE	$\frac{1}{5} \frac{1}{500} = \frac{601}{4} = \frac{16}{4} = 4$	
11 = 1.5 FOR BRITLE MOD	•	
$\left(\frac{\frac{C_1 Pm}{r_y}}{F_1}\right)^2 + \frac{\frac{C_2 Pm}{r_y}}{F_2} = 1$	$F_1 = \frac{T}{\pi + d_1} \sqrt{z_M}$	
(F) F2	$F_1 = \frac{11}{11(.3)} \sqrt{2(1.3)}$	5)-1
$\left(\frac{3828}{16.5 \text{ rg}}\right)^2 + \frac{163}{1667 \text{ rg}} = 1$	F1 = 16.5	1-4.
$\frac{53828.78}{ry^2} + \frac{544.23}{ry} = 1$	F2= T 124+	+ 1+.7(I)
	Fz = 11 V2(1)	1 + 1- 2(1.5)
53828.78 + 34423 ry = 1	F2 = 11 VZ(1)	1+,7 (11/4)
ry2-244.23 ry + (244.23)= 53828.78+	(244.23) $F_{2} = .6667$	
(ry-122.12) = 53528.78 + 14,912.41		
ry-122.12 V 68741.19	RECT	
ry = 262.18 + 120.12 = 384.21	DEST AVAI	LABLE COP
		- COP

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COMPUTED BY:

E. WILLIAMS

CHECKED BY: R.M.A. DATE:

V = 384.31 (3578.5) = 12, 970 #/N

RECHECK of d= VW = 12,970 = 13.1 < 16 OK .18(1.1)(5000) = .18(1.1)(5000)

DESIGN STIRRUPS FOR DUCTILE FAILURE MODE

V = 250 (3578.5) = 8437.5 / Vu = 8437.5 = 527 PSI

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SUBJECT:	E. WILL IAM'S	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: Q. M.Th.	DATE
CRITICAL SECTION A	IT ANCHOR BOLT	
$\frac{\psi_{i}}{135} = \frac{67.5}{527} \\ \chi_{i} = 17.29^{\circ} \qquad \frac{229}{\chi_{2}} = \frac{2}{\chi_{1}}$		·
	20.88	1 "
X= 17.29 5.	0.21"	
SHEAR ON 3		
TRY 1/4" & STIRRUPS	H=.049 "	
$S_{s} = \oint A_{s} \frac{1}{s} = \frac{.85}{5}$	$\frac{(.049)(66,000)}{(2)(3)} = 2.3$	3" use 27
No. STIRRUPS = 392((50.21)(3) = 9 ^t	
DETERMINE STRESS		4
Vay = .85 (.649) (66,000	c) = 229.1 Psi	

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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: Rm. Th	DATE:
26.96" 45P@ 3" 75P@ 4=28" 12" 50.21 (\$76 51.25" (\$1,28425) 55= .85 (.049) (66,000) 304.25 (3)	5 sp@ 2 1/4 11.25" erups)	@3"= 12" 0,4"= 28"
% OF STEEL CONSIDER 1/4 OF EACH BAR CONTRIBUTING 4 TO A 4"X 4" AREA $P_{Y} = \frac{.049}{16} = .003$	# 2 BAR	
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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY	DATE:
	E. WILLIAMS	
	CHECKED BY: RMIN	DATE:
DETERMINE RADIAL TO RING & REBARS	TUSILE STRESS I	IN BASE R
h= 74.5" a= 64"	1	1 10 1 x 1/2
		10 2 X 4
TAKE NO TENSION.		TAKU OUT
$P = \frac{5,460 \left(\frac{250}{165}\right) \left(296\right)}{\pi \times 135} =$		
$U_{EAR} = \frac{PL}{AE_S} = \frac{P_BL}{E_S} = \frac{P_BL}{E_S}$	$\frac{P_b(2b)}{E_s} = \frac{2P_bb}{E_s}$	$=\frac{2(74.5)P_{b}}{29\times10^{6}}=5.19\times10^{-6}P_{b}$
TIMOSHENKO ES (22+42 - 27 - 27 CF MAY.	u) Po: 572 Pr: RA	less on REBAR. I DIAL STEBS ON RING
$PART = \frac{74.5 P_{-}}{29 \times 10^{12}} \left[\frac{(64)^{2} + (64.5)}{(74.5)^{2} - (64)} \right]$	$\frac{1}{2} - 0.30 = 1.62$	7 x 16 - 6 Pr
$U_{8} = U_{R} = 5.14 \times 10^{-6} P_{6} =$	1.627 X106 Px	S
$P_b = \frac{1.627 \times 10^{-6} P_r}{5.14 \times 10^{-6}} =$. 316 Pr	7
15/16 + Pr= P USING # 4 @ 22"5	PACING	8
USING THE W. ZZ	7000 9	6
		20,

SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: Rm, th	DATE:
Ab P. t. Pr = P		
3 (.20)(1/2.5)(.316 Pr) + Pr =	5774 #/N	
1.076 Pr =	5774	
Pr=	5367#/4"	
Pb = . 316 P	-= .3/6 (5367)= 16	96 #/" Lone on REBARS
LOAD /FT ON REBARS =	1696 (12) = 2035	2#/FT
AREA REO'D = 20,352 66,000	= .31 ^{8"}	
# 4-@ 21/2 ONE LAYER		
$P = \frac{.96}{12(16)} = .00$	5 PROVIDED	
TOP STEEL REGID FOR	BENDING	
$K_{\mu} = \frac{M}{bd^2} = \frac{65,343(1)}{12(16)^2}$	2) = 255	
Red o $p = \frac{1}{m} \left[1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{2m}{fa}} \right]$	Ku]	
P = 12.42 [1- VI- 2 (12.	(255) (6,000)	
P= .00396		
AVAIL. TOP STEEL RATIO FOR	AXIAL LOAD = .005-	.00396 = .00104
# 4 @ 2 TWO LAYER	es on bettem	
p = 2(.96) = .01	PROVIDED	
12(16)		

SUBJECT:	E. WILLIAMS	DATE:	
	CHECKED BY: RM. M	DATE:	

AVAIL. LOTTON STEEL RATIO = .01. -.00992 = .0008

TOTAL AVAIL. STEEL TOP & LOT = .00104 +.00008 = .00112

TOTAL AREA OF STEEL FOR AXAL LOAD = .00112(12)(16) = .215000 = .215000 = .215000 = .215000 = .215000 = .215000 = .215000 =

DECREASE SPACING OF TOP & BOTTOM L'EINFORCING

TRY 2/4 SPACING

4 @ 2/4 = 1.07 %

P = 1.07 = .00557 " PROVIDED AT TOP

P= 2(1.07) = . 01115 " PROVIDED AT BOT.

Avail. @ Top= .00557 - .00396 = .00161 "

Avail. @ Boy. = .01115 - .00992 = .00123 "

TOTAL = .00284 "

TOTAL AREA AVAIL. FOR AXIAL LODD = . 00284 (12)(16)=. 54>.31

SUBJECT:	E. WILLI	AM5	DATE:
	CHECKED BY:	3.m.A	DATE:
COMPUTE ELASTIC ST			Xe
ROARK TABLE X		-(1= = 1	1 2 2 VCMO = 4. 27 Y 10
y= 311 (m-1) (5. 155 1077 Em=	$\frac{m+1}{t^3}a^2$	$ \mathcal{T} = 0.1 $ $ m = \frac{1}{2} $	= 1 = 6.67
=(3)\pi (135)(250)(6	.67-1) [5(6.67)+1	(67.5)	0.15
16 TI (4,29)(10			ES .
95= .17" SIN	ple suppo	RTED	
3 11 (-2 1) 2			
$y = \frac{3W(m^2 - 1)a^2}{10\pi E m^2 t^3}$			65
$= \sqrt[3]{135}(250) \left[\frac{1}{6.67} \right]$			
16 1 (4.24) (10)			3
= .038" FIX	ED		
DETERMINE NATURAL	FREQUENC	CY OF	SLAB
AFDM 8-27 T= 5.3 VW Kg	FOR	Square	SLAC W/SIMPLE SUPPORTS
9 = (130,2 FT/Sec2)(12 1//1)(1728 14)	(Fr) = .00404		17 - 176
L4 To	= Ic+ Ig Z = 174,09+ 486	Ic= Fbd = Ic= .0425(i)	VILY P=.00992
16 = 252 (4,24)(16) (330,04) (135)4 I	= 174.09+486 2 a= 330.04	Ic = 174.08 Ig = bTc	
$K = 1074.2$ $T = 5.3 \sqrt{.00404} = .0103$		I4 = 1003 =	486
fn= 1 = 97.3 CPS FRO	M HARRIS & C		USE CONSTANTS 01-15 SIGOROUND 5170 SQ
fno = 97.3 (3.70) = 100.7 1- 4	tn = .00993.	SEC.	PAGE 14 OF
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SUBJECT:	E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: R.M.Y.	DATE:
DETERMINE NATURAL WITHOUT WT. OF ROOF	FREGUENCY WE	ONLY
A = c	96 × 1.67 = 494.32	. = "
$K_2 = \frac{A}{L}$	E = 494,32 (29, (106	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
$f_{\eta} = \frac{1}{3}$	IT K	
$N = 296(5.7)(5) = 8436 + f_n = \frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{\pi} \sqrt{\frac{2.389 \times 10^8}{\frac{\cancel{5}\cancel{436}}{\cancel{3}\cancel{8}\cancel{6}}}}$	
$M_2 = \frac{8436}{386} = 21.85 \# \frac{100}{100}$	526 CP5	
$T=\frac{1}{f_n}=$	1 = .0019 SEC	
NOTE: SINCE 2 TWE <		
(FREQUENCIES CANNOT A SYSTEM IS GREATER	THAN 2 TIMES	THE
OTHER SYSTEM) SE	e BIGGS PAGE 2	33

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SUBJECT	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: RMIN	DATE:
DETERMINE NATURAL FRE	EQUENCY WE	CoLumvs
A= 494.32" K= 2.38	9 X 10 8	
$W_1 = WT$. of conc. = $At(I)$	(0 */H3) = T(B.33)2((1.5)(160) = 33,494
W2 = 8436 #	,	
$\omega = \sqrt{\frac{Kg}{N_1 + \frac{1}{3}w_2}} = \sqrt{\frac{(2.389)}{33,494}}$	$\frac{(10^8)(386)}{+8436} = 15$	93
$f_n = \frac{\omega}{2\pi} = \frac{1593}{2(\pi)} = 253.6$	CP5	
$T = \frac{1}{f_0} = \frac{1}{253.6} = .00394$		

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SUBJECT:	COMPUTED BY: E. WILL 14m 5	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: R.M. W.	DATE:
CHECK CAPACITY OF	SLAB	
REDUCE STEEL FOR BENE	DING AND USE FO	R AXIAL LCAD
% FOIL BENDING = .01115-	·00615 = .01034	
Kn = Pfdy (1- PM) = 10103		2)]
$Ku = 638.6$ $M_{HP} = Kubd^{2} = 638.6 (12)$ $M_{VII} = 5.580(12) - 49.230'$	(16) = 1,961,839.3'	1#/FT OR "#/s
$M_{VN} = \frac{5,580(12)}{1.433} = 49,239'$	11 #/N	709, 70010
$ryR^2 = G(M_{HP} + M_{VN})$		
$ry = 6(163,486.6 + 49,286.6)^2$	39) = 280 Psi	PROVIDED
FROM GRAPH SH. 1A	y = 280	
	T = 9.9 ms	
	M = 3.2	
DEFLECTION OF SLAB SH. 4		
$X_{e}W = \frac{PL}{AE} = \frac{3,578,400}{(494.32)(354.5)}$	$\frac{(60)}{26V_{0}(6)} = .015$	
Xe scas = ,17 SH. 14	27,10	
Xe = . 015 + . 17 = . 185"		
Xe 3.013 / // = 1/03	ro 1	
Xm = M Xe = 3.2 (185)=	. ST BEST_AVAIL	ABLE COPY

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SUBJECT: COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
SUBJECT: COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS	s Parts
CHECKED BY: Rmh	DATE:
DETERMINE MY REG'D BASED ON ACTUAL	7
$\left(\frac{\frac{C_1 P_{m}}{ry}}{\frac{ry}{F_1}}\right)^2 + \frac{\frac{C_2 P_m}{ry}}{\frac{ry}{F_2}} = 1$ $F_1 = \frac{T}{\pi t_{d_1}} \sqrt{2}$ $F_2 = 9.93$	
	48
$\left(\frac{156.37}{ry}\right)^{2} + \frac{192.90}{ry} = 1$ Find $\sqrt{2u-1}$	
$\frac{2445158}{ry^2} + \frac{192.90}{ry} = 1$ $F_2 = \frac{9.93}{\pi (1404)} \sqrt{2(3)}$	$\frac{1 - \frac{1}{2(3.2)}}{1 + .7(\frac{9.93}{14.04})}$
24, 451.58+ 193.90ry = 1 F2 = . 845	,
$r_y^2 - 192.90 \; r_y + \left(\frac{192.90}{2}\right)^2 = 24,451.58 + \left(\frac{192.90}{2}\right)^2$)2
(ry - 96.45)2 = 24,451.58 + 9302.60	
ry - 96.45 = 1 33,754.18	
ry = 183.72 + 96.45	
ry = 280. = 280 OK	
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SUB#ECT:	COMPUTED BY:	DATE:
	E. WILLIAMS	
	CHECKED BY: R.M.A.	DATE:
CHECK REBOUND		
$\frac{L_d}{T} = \frac{29}{9.9} = 2.93$ M	= 5.7	
FROM ASCE No. 42 ,	E1G. 9-1.4	
ry = 45 12 =- C. 45 rg	= -0.45(280)= 126	
7= 6 (MHD+ MVN) = 6 L	163,486.6 + 49,239. (47.5)2	7 = 172 > 126 ok
DETERIMINE TIME FOR	MAXIMUM RESPO	use, tm+ta
tm = .96 tm = .96 (.009	19) = .0095 scc on	2 9.5ms
$t_a = t_x \left(\frac{v}{v_0}\right)^3 = .28 \left(\frac{.48}{2000}\right)^3$	$\frac{1}{2}$ = .081 ms	locus Stock a 62.
$t_{m} + t_{a} = 9.5 + .081 = 9.$	581 ms	PAGE 188
t = d = 5.625 = .00	0078 SEC OR. 78	m15

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
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
	COMPUTED BY: E. WILLIAMS	DATE:
	CHECKED BY: RM. M.	DATE:
FRAGMENT ANALYSIS		
45ING TM 5-1300 CHAPTER 8		
$X_f = 0.162 (10^{-5}) W_f^{c, t} V_5^{1.8}$ $W_f = .25$ $V_S = 7200 FT/SEC$		
7. f = 0. 162 (10-5)(.25)0.4 (720	00)1.8 Vs=	7200 FT/SEC
Xf = 8.16"		
Xf= RXf ASSUME MILD STEEL R=.70		
= . 70 (8.16) = 5.7"		
Cs = 5.16 Ec = 5.16 V 4.29 x 106 = 10688		
$C_{i} = \left[\frac{T_{c} + 0.348 Wf^{3}}{X_{f}^{2}} - 1\right] \left[\frac{C_{5}}{V_{5}}\right]^{\frac{1}{3}}$		
$C_1 = \left[\frac{18 + 0.348(.25)^{1/3}}{5.7} - 1\right] \left[\frac{10688}{7200}\right]^{\frac{1}{3}} = 2.474$		
	FROM F16. 8- No SPALLING WI	
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
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
APPENDIX I - DRAWINGS

(The following drawings show the details of the various penetrations for each safety approved shield group.)













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





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









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





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
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








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



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



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





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
















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



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



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






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












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















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